Stony Brook University

Nevertheless, the application of the modes to specific actions remains unclear. Therefore,
I have devised the following brief examples which I think accurately represent his
intentions.
1. It is just, permitted, morally possible—that I pick an apple from a tree,
provided this tree belongs to no one (i.e., without violating the same right of another
person). This is permitted by ius (the moral quality or faculty enabling me to do preserve
myself as far as is permitted). Since I can refrain from picking the apple as well, this right
is a possible action. It is not morally, logically, nor physically necessary that I pick the
apple. Moreover, another person does not have the moral possibility to take it from me
(once I have acquired it under permissible conditions), although she may have the
physical possibility of doing so.
2. It is unjust, forbidden, morally impossible—that I take an apple against the will
of the one to which the apple belongs, though it is logically and physically possible that I
do so.
3. It is equitable, obligatory, morally necessary—that I do what is equitable; that
is, if I have apples to spare and others need them for their livelihood, or even enjoyment,
then I am morally obligated to distribute them. To refuse another the means of livelihood
when I can provide it without harm to myself constitutes a harm, and even worse, a harm
from which I unnecessarily benefit. However, I am not logically or physically
necessitated to provide for another.
4. It is omissible—that I do nothing with the apples, whether they are mine or not,
and to allow others to take them as they want, as long as it is permitted, and as long as it
is not obligatory. The omissible mode applies to actions having no moral consequence.
These and other relations can be read off the square of inference. But the relations
can be reduced to two main classifications of action: morally possible (encompassing the
just, the obligatory, and the omissible) and the morally impossible (the unjust, forbidden).
This means that most actions fall under the modal category of the possible. As Busche
points out, this means that for Leibniz obligation starts from the “primacy of the
possible,” rather than from the forbidden (or prohibited). I think there is another way to
put it, that obligation starts with the freedom of the subject. The moral quality of a person
is, after all, the power, capability, and virtue to act in a manner consistent with the moral
qualities of another. This implies that a person is capable of transgressing, or acting
inconsistently with, the moral power of another. Thus we can speak of moral freedom, as
consisting in the capacity to limit one’s freedom. Moral possibility implies obligation—
that is, the self-limitation of one’s conduct. Thus, “the primacy of the possible,” morally
speaking, must include a limitation on what is logically possible to do. To conclude from
this so far: Right is the moral power of the good person. Obligation is the moral necessity
of the good person. From these deontic terms one can derive all other relations of deontic
possibility and necessity for the good person.
We must now ask the following: (1) If ‘if p is an obligation -> p is possible’ is
true for Leibniz, what makes p an obligation? To answer this question, we must first
understand that there is an important interrelationship between the modes of right and the
alethic modes. This relationship involves the principle that “ought implies can,” whose
symbolic expression is: Op -> ◊p. This says that if p is obligatory, then p is possible. In
other words, everything obligatory is possible for any rational person to do. That is, you
cannot be obligated to do something that is impossible for you to do. Leibniz
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