Stony Brook University

intention is to show that jurisprudence is the science of universal justice encompassing
subordinate levels of good, as well as of right, from highest right to lowest. 36 The utilities
of God, Humanity, and the State correspond, as we will see, to the Roman precepts of
right: honeste vivere, suum cuique tribuere, and neminem laedere. 37 Thus, public utility
(which becomes ‘the common good’ in later texts) has a certain priority over individual
utility, as it does for Plato. 38 Indeed, Leibniz’s intention is clarified in the sentences
immediately following the above passage:
There is an order of subordination of utility in cases of conflict: the will or
utility of God, if it is permitted to speak thus, is preferred to the utility of
Humankind, and these [are preferred] to the utility of the State, and this is
preferred to one’s own utility; from which comes Divine, Human, and
Civil jurisprudence. 39
Thus, private (individual) utility (which comes under civil jurisprudence) appears to be
subordinate to public utility.
This position, however, represents a characteristic problem for Leibniz; namely,
his overall effort, not entirely successful, to harmonize public and private utility. It is not
clear in Leibniz that the overall aim of public utility justifies the subordination of private
utility, since public utility also entails the preservation of certain individual rights.
Indeed, as I will argue, subjective right is not only the ground of individual rights but also
of public utility. While most commentators are disposed to think that Leibniz’s practical
philosophy is grounded in the requirements of public utility, I argue that it is grounded in
the moral nature of rational substance. Public utility is the practical extension of its
moral nature. As we will soon see, the above series of definitions beginning with
‘jurisprudence,’ is intended to define an objective sphere of jurisprudence. In other
words, jurisprudence has application to the conditions which promote public utility,
36 At this point it we may suppose that “the good” for Leibniz is not simply the happiness of all individuals
but rather the moral florishing of rational minds, which is to say virtue. This claim will be better established
in Chapter Six.
37 These “three degrees of right” will be examined below, in Section 4 of this chapter.
38 We can recall the passage from Plato’s Laws, cited above, where the Athenian says: “It is hard, in the
first place, to perceive that a true social science must be concerned with the community, not with the
individual—common interest tending to cement society as private to disrupt it—and that it is to the
advantage of community and individual at once that public well-being should be considered before private.
(Gnônai men gar prôton chalepon hoti politikêi kai alêthei technêi ou to idion alla to koinon anankê
melein--to men gar koinon sundei, to de idion diaspai tas poleis--kai hoti sumpherei tôi koinôi te kai idiôi,
toin amphoin, ên to koinon tithêtai kalôs mallon ê to idion.) Again, even one who had attained clear
perception of this principle as a point of scientific theory, if subsequenctly placed in a position of
irresponsible autocratic sovereignty, would never prove loyal to his conviction, or spend his life in the
promotion of the public good of the state as the paramount object to which his own advantage must be
secondary” (875 a-b).
39 A.6.1.301.§14: “Hac subordinatione, ut in casu pugnantiae, voluntas, seu utilitas Dei, si ita loqui licet,
praeferatur utilitati generis humani, et haec utilitati reipublicae, et haec propriae. Hinc Jurisprudentia
Divina, Humana, Civilis.” The sentence immediately following is misleading: “Private utility belongs not
to Jurisprudence but to Politics (De propria autem utilitate dicere, non Jurisprudentia, sed Politicae est)”.
But this is not what he means. As Busche points out (footnote p. 323), in a letter to Conring (January 1670)
Leibniz clarifies that he aims to place private utility under ethics, and public utility under politics and
positive law.
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