Stony Brook University

understanding, however confused. We need not enter into the particulars of his doctrine
of expression here. What Leibniz intends to suggest is that an inclination for pleasure or
joy may eventually be expressed as a practical precept. And while this precept may not be
distinctly known by the understanding, it can certainly become distinctly known. That is,
when we sufficiently reflect on the inclination of joy, by sorting out its content, causes,
and objective (initially, one’s own good, but when well-considered, the general good), it
becomes a practical precept—say, perhaps, do good to everyone. Furthermore, in this
way moral knowledge can be considered innate, insofar as the practical precept expresses
an innate instinct for joy. Leibniz’s formulations here also suggest how moral doctrine
may be demonstrable. If the instinct for joy logically implies a practical precept, such as
do good to everyone, then the ground of the precept (which is the instinct) has been
demonstrated. Once again we have an indication that the science of morals is
demonstrable on the principle of pleasure and pain.
Leibniz then turns to a brief argument in support of speculative principles. Just as
we employ practical instincts in moral action, we employ theoretical “instincts” in
scientific and logical thinking.
Nor do instincts always pertain to practice; some of them contain
theoretical truths – the internal principles of the sciences and of reasoning
are like that when we employ them through a natural instinct without
knowing the reasons for them. You cannot avoid acknowledging some
innate principle, in this sense, even if you wanted to deny that derivative
truths are innate. (NE 1.2.3.90) 39
Leibniz is referring to speculative principles such as the principles of identity and
contradiction. These principles are instincts, in the sense that they are unconsciously
utilized in thinking. 40 As Leibniz also puts it, “everyone makes use of the rules of
inference through a natural logic, without being aware of them” (NE 1.2.3.91). 41 And
since we unknowingly employ speculative or theoretical principles in everyday logical
inferences, we must be employing innate principles. Therefore, since we unconsciously
employ practical principles in actions and speculative principles in thinking, both types of
principle are innate. 42 But Leibniz’s main intent for this argument is simply to show that
39
A.6.6.90: “Les instincts aussi ne sont pas tousjours de pratique: il y en a qui contiennent des verités de
theorie, et tels sont les principles internes des sciences et du raisonnement lors que sans en connoistre la
raison, nous les employons par un instinct naturel. Et dans ce sense vous ne pouvés pas vous dispenser de
reconnoistre des principes innés: quand même vous voudriés nier que les verités derivatives sont innées.”
40
Or, as Nicholas Jolley (1984) argues, speculative principles may be operating either implicitly or
dispositionally in our reasoning. According to Jolley, Leibniz appears to have two theories of innateness, in
regard to speculative principles. One based on implicit knowledge, the other based on dispositional
tendency. Implicit knowledge is employed in our thought of particulars—as when the concept of identity is
implied in the judgment, ‘the black cat is the same color as the black dog. Dispositional tendency occurs
when we supply the missing premise of an enthymeme or recognize the logical consistency of an argument.
As for moral principles, not only are they sensual instincts, but they are both implicit and dispositional in
our moral thinking.
41
A.6.6.91: “Tout le monde employe les regles des consequences par une Logique naturelle sans s’en
appercevoir.”
42
This is, in effect, Leibniz’s whole argument for innateness. However, the argument is hardly conclusive.
At least as regarding practical instincts, it is rather uncontroversial that we have an instinct to pursue
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