Stony Brook University

dealings, except when an important consideration of a greater good makes us depart from
it” (RC 173). 106 But what counts as an “important consideration? What is the greater
good? Leibniz does not say. 107
We finally come to the third degree of right, piety, and here we encounter an
increasingly familiar conflict. The issue basically comes down to this: why be honorable
and virtuous? On one hand Leibniz offers theological reasons. Piety “perfects” the other
two degrees by encouraging us to act as we should. 108 On the other hand, true virtue does
not require such encouragement, but ought to be done for its own sake. This is indicated
in the following passage, which explains that moral requirements may be met by the
criteria already offered, in this life; but since we are insufficiently virtuous, we require
otherworldly incentives.
The highest degree of right I have called probity, or rather piety. What I
have said thus far can be interpreted as limited to the relations within
mortal life. Simple or strict right is born of the principle of conservation of
peace; equity or charity strives for something higher [namely] that while
each benefits others as much as he can, he may increase his own happiness
in that of the other. And, to say it in a word, strict right avoids misery,
while the higher right tends toward happiness, but only such as is possible
in this life. But that we ought to hold this life itself and everything that
makes it desirable inferior to the great advantage of others, and that we
should bear the greatest pains for the sake of those near us: all this is
[merely] taught with noble words by philosophers, rather than proved by
solid demonstration. (RC 173) 109
It is a “noble” idea, rather than demonstrably certain, that the advantage of others is
greater than our own. The passage goes on to provide some idea of what honor is, and
then points out that this good of the mind is often not powerful enough to move us to act
honorably. It is effective only in those who are predisposed or trained in this virtue.
For the dignity and glory, and our mind’s sense of joy on account of
virtue, to which they appeal under the name of honor are certainly goods
of thought or of the mind and are, indeed, great ones, but not such as to
prevail with all, nor to overcome all the bitterness of evils, since not all
men are equally moved by the imagination; [especially those who have not
106
A.4.5.62: “Nempe ipsa aequitas nobis in negotiis jus strictum, id est hominum aequalitatem,
commendat, nisi cum gravis ratio boni majoris ab ea recedi jubet.”
107
It should be noted that in the Elementa Leibniz set a limit on rights of possession, that is, in a state of
national emergency rights of possession may be violated, if doing so has better results for everyone.
108
From Nova Methodus: “Piety then is the third degree of natural law, and it gives to the others their
perfection and execution” (A.6.1.344.§75).
109
A 4.5.62-63: “Supremum Juris gradum probitatis vel potius Pietatis nomine appellavi. Nam hactenus
dicta sic accipi possunt, ut intra mortalis vitae respectus coerceantur. Et jus quidem merum sive strictum
nascitur ex principio servandae pacis; aequitas sive caritas ad majus aliquid contendit, ut dum quisque alteri
prodest quantum potest, felicitatem suam augeat in aliena; et ut verbo dicam jus strictum miseriam vitat, jus
superius ad felicitatem tendit, sed qualis in hanc mortalitatem cadit. Quod vero ipsam vitam, et quicquid
hanc vitam expetendam facit, magno commodo alieno posthabere debeamus, ita ut maximos etiam dolores
in aliorum gratiam perferre oporteat; magis pulchre praecipitur a Philosophis, quam solide demonstratur.”
135