Stony Brook University

This formulation of justice as a virtue involving affects serves to move Leibniz
toward considering what sort of virtue justice really is, and what exactly a just condition
is. These are important developments toward deciding whether justice involves a mean in
things or in a mean of affections. As we turn to Draft 3, Leibniz again endorses a view he
had originally broached in the very last paragraph of his De Arte Combinatoria (1666). 31
There, he had cited Grotius’ criticism of Aristotle, 32 according to which, Aristotle had
miscategorized the kind of virtue that justice is. Virtues generally are means of affections.
But Aristotle classifies justice as a mean in things, meaning that justice is the disposition
to give another her due in things or goods. According to Grotius, this is a
misclassification of species (or a category mistake) since, if virtues are means of
affections, and justice is a virtue, justice cannot consist in a mean of things. Leibniz,
however, claims that justice can be understood as a mean of affections, although in the
De Arte Combinatoria he does not explain how. But in the Elementa he does, and
moreover he hits upon the theme that will become a central and permanent component of
subsequent definitions of justice.
Aristotle has arranged all the virtues in a certain moderating affection,
with the sole exception of justice, which is concerned with a medium of
things. But if you will have examined [the matter] more closely, you will
learn that justice is the moderator of love and aversion of a man toward
other men. Nor indeed must we love one so that we harm another; nor hate
one more than required of another. Now there are two rules for moderating
these affections: 1. Harm no one. 2. Help everyone, so far as not to harm a
third. In the former rule Justice is founded; in the latter is Friendship or
Equity. 33
Presumably, Leibniz thinks that the right kind of affection toward others will result in the
right kind of action. However, he also seems to think of these “two rules” he cites here as
regulating the affections. This is an important point. Notably, these two rules correspond
to the first two degrees of natural right, i.e., strict right and equity. He also goes on to say
that only the first rule may be enforced or regulated, while the rule of helping
(characteristic of friendship) may not be. 34 This is quite sensible, since it does not seem
possible legally to enforce affections. At the same time, affections require some kind of
rule, and Leibniz will be forever seeking the right rule for them. But the most significant
development in this passage is the implicit introduction of the notion of practical love.
31
A.6.1.229-30. Also, I cite most of this passage in Chapter One, on discussion of §14 of the Nova
Methodus.
32
GJ prolegomena sec. 44-45. Virtue as a mean in affections is discussed by Aristotle in AE 1106a15-
1106b. Justice as a mean of things may be seen, roughly, at 1133b33. I do not address whether Grotius or
Leibniz’s understanding of Aristotle is accurate. Busche remarks that Leibniz’s claims are hard to verify
from Aristotle’s text (B 460, fn. 119).
33
A.6.1.455: “Aristoteles collocavit virtutes omnes in affectu qvodam moderando, solius justitiae medium
in rebus tantum qvaesivit. At si acutius introspexeris, comperies justitiam esse moderatricem amoris atqve
odii hominis erga hominem. Neqve enim unum ita amare debemus, ut alteri noceamus; neqve unum ultra
odisse, qvam alteri opus est. Duae sunt autem Regulae Affectus huius moderandi, I.) neminem laedere, 2.)
cuiqve qvousqve alius non laeditur prodesse. In illo Iustitia fundatur, in hoc Amicitia seu Aeqvitas.”
34
A.6.1.455: “Licet autem impedire laedentum, non me tantum, sed alium. Ad juvandum alios cogi non
possum, regulariter.”
52