Stony Brook University

egulating our practice. (E 1.2.3)
In sum, in only one sense is there an innate practical principle, for Locke, i.e., a natural
inclination to pursue pleasure and avoid pain. As he says in a later chapter, “things then
are good or evil, only in reference to pleasure or pain. That we call good, which is apt to
cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us. . . we name that evil which is apt to
produce or increase pain” (E.2.20.2). As we will see, Leibniz agrees with Locke that we
are motivated by pleasure and pain and that these are innate principles. However, he will
also claim that this principle is not sufficient for morally correct action. Thus, there are
principles of reason that, when not obscured by custom, passions, and habits, not only
move us to act, but move us to act rightly.
Section 3: Leibniz on innate practical principles
One interesting feature of Leibniz’s engagement with Locke over innate
principles is that from the beginning Leibniz takes his most fundamental metaphysical
assumption out of play.
I believe indeed that all thoughts and actions of our soul come from its
own depths and could not be given to it by the senses [as you are going to
see in the following]. But in the meantime I shall set aside the inquiry into
that, and shall conform to accepted ways of speaking, since they are
indeed sound and justifiable, and the outer senses can be said to be, in a
certain sense, partial causes of our thoughts. (NE 1.1.1.74) 19
In strict metaphysical rigor, for Leibniz, all determinations of a substance are intrinsic to
that substance. Thus, there would be no point in distinguishing innate ideas from acquired
ones, since whatever a substance will know or experience is already contained within the
substance. All acquired knowledge is thus considered clear and distinct knowledge of
what was formerly confused and obscure. Nevertheless, Leibniz maintains it makes sense
to speak on the empiricist level about knowledge acquired from experience and the
senses. In this way, he can say that while we may not be consciously aware of innate
speculative principles, such as the principles of identity and contradiction, we can
nevertheless come to recognize them through experience, reflection, and demonstration.
Leibniz can also distinguish truths of fact drawn from sense experience from truths of
reason derived only from the innate understanding.
But it seems that the author’s [Locke’s] zeal, highly praiseworthy as it is,
has carried him too far in another direction. In my opinion he has not
adequately distinguished the origin of necessary truths, whose source is in
the understanding, from that of truths of fact, which are drawn from sense
19 A.6.6.74: “Je crois meme que toutes les pensées et actions de notre ame viennent de son propre fonds,
sans lui pouvoir être données par les sens, comme vous allées voir dans la suite. Mais à present je metrai
cette recherce à part, et m’accommodant aux expressions receuës, puis qu’en effet elles sont bonnes et
soutenables, et qu’on peut dire dans un certain sens, que les sense externes sont causes en partie de nos
pensées.”
173