Stony Brook University

of right. Since right is the moral power to do what is just, obligation follows as the moral
necessity to do what is just. But the argument from love introduces a difficulty: If to love
is just (equitable), and to love is to find pleasure in the good of another, then we are
obligated to find pleasure in the good of another. In fact, love makes it motivationally
possible to be just, so therefore we are obligated to love another. Yet consequently if we
do not find pleasure in the good of another, then we cannot act justly; and arguably we
ought to act justly, whether or not we find pleasure in it. In addition, it seems strange to
make feelings obligations, since feelings are experiences we either have or do not, as the
result of doing certain things and cannot be commanded. However, I think that Leibniz
actually thinks that a feeling, namely, the pleasure in love, can be obligated in the
following way: We are obligated (by right) to be equitable. To be equitable is to love
everyone. In order to act equitably, we must find pleasure in it. Therefore, if we do not
find pleasure in equity, then we are obligated to find pleasure in it. Feelings may not be
commanded right away, but we can develop the habit of having the appropriate feeling in
order to perform our obligations. That is, if we do not already possess the virtue or
disposition to act justly, then we are obligated to acquire it. We are obligated because
acting equitably is required by right. This is in fact why justice turns out to be the virtue
of acting justly. This way of understanding the matter of obligation makes sense. Since
the just means to love everyone, then justice means “the habit of loving everyone.” In
fact, exactly this definition of justice introduces the following Drafts, 5 and 6, and
generates a substantial demonstration, as we will soon see.
Finally, the last sentence of the paragraph and of Draft 4: “Right (ius) is the power
(potentia) of doing what is just (iustum)”. This concluding sentence seems to come out of
nowhere, unless we recall that the term right was investigated in the very first paragraph
of the investigation. There we found the moral qualities implied: right is a moral power;
obligation a moral necessity. Now we can fit this in with the rest of the investigation.
Right is the power of loving everyone, of doing what is morally permissible, morally
possible, what is just. And since right is a duplex quality, these are our obligations, as
well. 112 This is significant because it means that the just is ultimately grounded in, or
made possible by, subjective right, i.e., the moral qualities of a rational substance. It is
also important to note that the moral qualities of right and obligation will be explicitly reintroduced
in Drafts 5 and 6 as the moral qualities of the vir bonus, and used to develop
an a priori normative “logic of right.”
There is however another level to keep in mind. The whole investigation began on
this premise: “From the beginning, however, both our own good and that of others are
involved in the question of right.” We saw that the definition of love was introduced there
as the descriptive motive that makes it possible to carry out the prescriptive (normative)
demands of right. At least, that is my argument, that Leibniz is working out the
descriptive and prescriptive levels of right, and these levels must be understood to have
separate grounds. It is apparent that the descriptive principles of pleasure and happiness
are invoked largely as psychophysical motives, whose function is to make it possible to
perform what subjective right normatively prescribes. Strictly speaking, if I am obligated
to “love” someone, then it is only because right imposes this obligation. I am not
obligated by the psychophysical motivation. However, the only way I can fulfill the
112 Actually, this is misleading, since it appears to make all permissions obligatory; but all that is meant is
that “everything morally necessary is permissible.” This will be clarified in section 4.
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