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Table of Contents Abstract...........................................................................................................................iii Preface............................................................................................................................vii Acknowledgements.........................................................................................................ix CHAPTER ONE: SUBJECTIVE RIGHT AND THE SCIENCE OF JURISPRUDENCE IN THE NOVA METHODUS. .......................................................................................................................... 1 Section 1: Introduction..................................................................................................... 1 Section 2: General Remarks on Parts I and II of the Nova Methodus ............................. 2 Section 3: The “New Method” of jurisprudence and its definitions: jus and obligatio... 8 Section 4: The derivation of precepts: the three degrees of natural right...................... 24 Section 5: Chapter summary and conclusion................................................................. 37 CHAPTER TWO: JUSTICE, LOVE, AND THE MODES OF RIGHT IN THE ELEMENTA JURIS NATURALIS.......................................................................................................................... 42 Section 1: Introduction................................................................................................... 42 Section 2: The just as equity; justice as virtue of the mean ........................................... 46 Section 3: Right, just, justice, and the nature of love .................................................... 54 Section 4: The normative logic of right ......................................................................... 77 Section 5: Leibniz’s demonstration of ‘the good person is one who loves everyone.’ . 88 Section 6: Concluding considerations............................................................................ 98 CHAPTER THREE: THE MIDDLE PERIOD: IUS, CARITAS, AND THE CODEX JURIS GENTIUM DIPLOMATICI .................................................................................................................... 103 Section 1: Introduction................................................................................................. 103 Section 2: Early letters: Hobbes, Arnauld, Johann Friedrich....................................... 104 Section 3: The late 1670’s: Right, right reason, and justice as caritas sapientis......... 106 Section 4: Preface to the Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus..................................... 127 Section 5: Chapter conclusion ..................................................................................... 138 CHAPTER FOUR: LEIBNIZ’S DEMONSTRATIVE METHOD.................................................... 139 Section 1: Introduction................................................................................................. 139 Section 2: The distinction between necessary and contingent truths........................... 140 Section 3. Demonstration in general............................................................................ 147 Section 4: Definition defined....................................................................................... 152 Section 5: The case of the demonstrated moral conclusion......................................... 159 Section 6: Did Leibniz demonstrate the proposition ‘justice is the charity of the wise’? ...................................................................................................................................... 163 Section 7: Chapter conclusion ..................................................................................... 164 CHAPTER FIVE: MORAL DOCTRINE AS A DEMONSTRATIVE SCIENCE IN THE NOUVEAUX ESSAIS............................................................................................................................... 166 Section 1: Introduction................................................................................................. 166 Section 2: Locke on innate speculative and practical principles ................................. 167 Section 3: Leibniz on innate practical principles......................................................... 173 Section 4: Moral doctrine, pure reason, and the science of right................................. 193 Section 5: Integration of principles in virtue ............................................................... 197 Section 6: Chapter conclusion ..................................................................................... 201 CHAPTER SIX: MONITA AND MEDITATION: CAUSES AND NOTIONS IN THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT ......................................................................................................................................... 203 v
Section 1: Introduction................................................................................................. 203 Section 2: The Science of Right in Monita quaedam ad Puffendorfii Principia......... 204 Section 3: The Science of Right in Méditation sur la Notion Commune de la Justice 214 Section 4: Features of Leibniz’s Golden Rule ............................................................. 226 Section 5: Two degrees of right: equality and equity .................................................. 228 Section 6: The third degree of right: Piety and the spiritual disposition ..................... 232 Section 7: Chapter conclusion: Truth, definition, obligation....................................... 240 CHAPTER SEVEN: NECESSITY, OBLIGATION, AND FREEDOM............................................ 243 Section 1: Pre-Leibnizian moral necessity................................................................... 243 Section 2: Early formulations ...................................................................................... 246 Section 3: Late formulations in the correspondence with Clarke................................ 250 Section 4: Late formulations in Theodicy. ................................................................... 254 Section 5: Dissertation summary of conclusions......................................................... 257 Bibliography.................................................................................................................... 260 vi
Page 1 and 2: Stony Brook University The official
Page 3 and 4: Copyright by Christopher Lowell Joh
Page 5 and 6: Abstract of the Dissertation The Sc
Page 7: The more power he has, the less lic
Page 11 and 12: show, however, that pleasure and lo
Page 13 and 14: CHAPTER ONE: SUBJECTIVE RIGHT AND T
Page 15 and 16: By a plan for studies we mean a cer
Page 17 and 18: that for Leibniz the science of jur
Page 19 and 20: of these sources. In (1) the ground
Page 21 and 22: etween “fact” on one hand and
Page 23 and 24: however ‘public utility’ is def
Page 25 and 26: Grotius’ two significations of
Page 27 and 28: obligatio. That is, conceptually sp
Page 29 and 30: one’s own body; furthermore, give
Page 31 and 32: words, the sense in which God is su
Page 33 and 34: ight of war and punishment to the S
Page 35 and 36: qualities are the ground of public
Page 37 and 38: what conforms to the best or perfec
Page 39 and 40: Beginning with jus strictum or what
Page 41 and 42: proportion to contribution, this is
Page 43 and 44: of equity. 117 Nevertheless, it app
Page 45 and 46: agrees with the distinction between
Page 47 and 48: eward or fear of punishment, nor si
Page 49 and 50: eflecting God’s perfection as muc
Page 51 and 52: second degrees. As a precept of pie
Page 53 and 54: of a set of prudential instructions
Page 55 and 56: In Drafts 5 and 6 Leibniz then appl
Page 57 and 58: egulated. As we will eventually see
Page 59 and 60:
advantage connected with the disadv
Page 61 and 62:
To see how this passage implies pru
Page 63 and 64:
establishes three important positio
Page 65 and 66:
Justice must (and will always) invo
Page 67 and 68:
y making the “deduction” that t
Page 69 and 70:
Leibniz also seems to think that th
Page 71 and 72:
[determine] the truth of propositio
Page 73 and 74:
Prudence, furthermore, cannot be se
Page 75 and 76:
Once again, as was to be shown, dut
Page 77 and 78:
own and other good. The first defin
Page 79 and 80:
of the matter. The main considerati
Page 81 and 82:
of any other good, even if pleasure
Page 83 and 84:
failing to recognize that pleasure
Page 85 and 86:
another. Leibniz’s “epagogic”
Page 87 and 88:
of right. Since right is the moral
Page 89 and 90:
critical diligence to his definitio
Page 91 and 92:
constant, I say, not that it may no
Page 93 and 94:
mode of right have different truth
Page 95 and 96:
the four types of statements of the
Page 97 and 98:
accommodates this principle in the
Page 99 and 100:
overcome the heart, as the Germans
Page 101 and 102:
(1). “A Person is one who (2) lov
Page 103 and 104:
state, but in being unimpeded from
Page 105 and 106:
the Meditation Leibniz says that th
Page 107 and 108:
will be tacitly understood. Because
Page 109 and 110:
probability of an action occurring
Page 111 and 112:
perceive and direct the harmonious
Page 113 and 114:
However, it ought to be recognized
Page 115 and 116:
CHAPTER THREE: THE MIDDLE PERIOD: I
Page 117 and 118:
deductive system of natural right.
Page 119 and 120:
It appears that the “modes of rig
Page 121 and 122:
The just—or permitted, forbidden,
Page 123 and 124:
is the right from which humans act,
Page 125 and 126:
normative character they must be un
Page 127 and 128:
Precepts of Right (Leibniz, Digest)
Page 129 and 130:
This passage is quite important and
Page 131 and 132:
and penalties” but rather are abl
Page 133 and 134:
of the three degrees in the same te
Page 135 and 136:
It is interesting that Leibniz defi
Page 137 and 138:
And since charity is the habit of l
Page 139 and 140:
has also influenced the prevailing
Page 141 and 142:
What must not be overlooked is that
Page 143 and 144:
the wise, and many other things bes
Page 145 and 146:
degrees is to be found in the sourc
Page 147 and 148:
dealings, except when an important
Page 149 and 150:
sacrifice our own happiness for the
Page 151 and 152:
CHAPTER FOUR: LEIBNIZ’S DEMONSTRA
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terms used frequently throughout th
Page 155 and 156:
these distinctions in demonstration
Page 157 and 158:
It is important to state the distin
Page 159 and 160:
Section 3. Demonstration in general
Page 161 and 162:
that Leibniz has used for various p
Page 163 and 164:
necessary truths, but are contingen
Page 165 and 166:
defines definition in the following
Page 167 and 168:
Another example of the difference i
Page 169 and 170:
It will be further asked what the g
Page 171 and 172:
possible; but this does not show th
Page 173 and 174:
Leibniz’s argument is this: To ma
Page 175 and 176:
notion of probability, which they h
Page 177 and 178:
quasi-platonic essences (residing i
Page 179 and 180:
arguments on innateness, we discove
Page 181 and 182:
manifest proofs that they are not i
Page 183 and 184:
in mathematics, the measures of rig
Page 185 and 186:
egulating our practice. (E 1.2.3) I
Page 187 and 188:
senses what joy and sorrow are. (NE
Page 189 and 190:
follows where we left off on page 8
Page 191 and 192:
As Leibniz has argued similarly in
Page 193 and 194:
It is not quite clear what he means
Page 195 and 196:
just because a principle is not kno
Page 197 and 198:
not have distinct knowledge of its
Page 199 and 200:
actions and the goodness or evil th
Page 201 and 202:
Essais. These sources, as he says t
Page 203 and 204:
Leibniz cites a number of instincts
Page 205 and 206:
our passions and our present concer
Page 207 and 208:
The ordinary use of the word ‘pro
Page 209 and 210:
state, constitute [natural right];
Page 211 and 212:
ecognizes how the senses can obscur
Page 213 and 214:
proposition; rather, possessing a v
Page 215 and 216:
CHAPTER SIX: MONITA AND MEDITATION:
Page 217 and 218:
committing crimes with impunity. Ul
Page 219 and 220:
In the science of [right], rather,
Page 221 and 222:
i.e., that she is the author of her
Page 223 and 224:
sufficient to establish the obligat
Page 225 and 226:
This notion of “complaint” will
Page 227 and 228:
It is agreed that whatever God will
Page 229 and 230:
terminology, Leibniz holds that nat
Page 231 and 232:
different matter, but if it [occurs
Page 233 and 234:
need of help, and another who easil
Page 235 and 236:
‘equality,’ considered as “co
Page 237 and 238:
such a way that no one has a reason
Page 239 and 240:
excused from showing benevolence to
Page 241 and 242:
this. In any case, the real problem
Page 243 and 244:
This means that the slave should be
Page 245 and 246:
its efficient cause in the divine i
Page 247 and 248:
a degree is it repugnant to reason
Page 249 and 250:
external principle that compels God
Page 251 and 252:
again at last to the Ciceronian for
Page 253 and 254:
as equity; justice as love) were de
Page 255 and 256:
CHAPTER SEVEN: NECESSITY, OBLIGATIO
Page 257 and 258:
Thus in the Theodicy Leibniz uses m
Page 259 and 260:
incapable of demonstrations. A scie
Page 261 and 262:
Furthermore, we must not forget tha
Page 263 and 264:
perceived to be the good. 24 Howeve
Page 265 and 266:
Several points are notable here: Fi
Page 267 and 268:
find the eternal rules of goodness
Page 269 and 270:
Accordingly, the perfection of the
Page 271 and 272:
an account of virtue. This shows, o
Page 273 and 274:
H Hobbes, Thomas. 1651. Leviathan.
Page 275 and 276:
Studia Leibniziana. Band 22. vol.2.
Page 277 and 278:
Reiner, Hans. 1977. “Die Goldene
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