Stony Brook University

constant, I say, not that it may not be changed, but that it may not be changed easily.” 120
A bit further down, ‘the good person’ is defined as ‘one who loves everyone.’ These
definitions show, at least, that Leibniz conceives of justice as a habit or disposition, that
is, as the virtue of loving universally. Thus, the good person is one who possesses the
habit of universal love. This suggests that universal love is a duty. But how far is this
duty supposed to extend? It is the purpose of what follows to try to determine the scope
of obligation. It is also very important to note that an important change in the definition
of the “objective sphere” of jurisprudence has taken place. Recall that in the Nova
Methodus “the just” was defined as “public utility.” From now on however ‘the just’ and
‘justice’ will be defined in terms of love, where ‘love’ means not erotic love (although he
still uses the term amor) but rather universal benevolence or caritas. In other words,
where the just (or objective sphere of right) meant ‘public utility,’ it now means ‘loving
everyone.’ Justice is then the virtue of loving everyone. This shift is also significant since
it represents an important step toward Leibniz’s eventual definition of justice as ‘the
charity of the wise,’ first broached in 1677.
Now that the just condition has been redefined as loving everyone, and justice has
been defined as the virtue of loving everyone; and, the good person is one who loves
everyone, the next step is to redefine the subjective counterpart to these objective
conditions. That is, the moral qualities of the good person are now to be understood as
the virtues of the good person. The moral qualities are introduced in the passage
immediately following the above definitions.
Right is the power
Obligation the necessity
(of the good person, for what Grotius called Moral Qualities,
are nothing other than the qualities of the good person). 121
As we saw in the Nova Methodus, the moral qualities of right and obligation were
qualities of a rational substance. 122 We called these qualities the basis of “subjective
right,” that is, the qualities of a person that enable him/her to act morally and justly. But
now we can understand the moral qualities as virtues. That is, justice is the disposition or
moral power (potentia) of a person to love everyone. It helps to note briefly that the
phrase, ‘the good person’ (vir bonus) was commonly used by Cicero and others to signify
a morally and intellectually distinguished person. 123 Leibniz himself however seems to
have Aristotle’s phronemos, or “man of practical wisdom” in mind. This is affirmed in a
passage a bit further down (in Draft 6), where Leibniz directly refers to Aristotle’s Ethics.
Wisely the Roman Jurisconsults, when the laws could not clearly
determine the case, often depended on the judgment of the good person, in
120 A.6.1.480: “IUSTITIA est habitus (seu status confirmatus) viri boni, confirmatus inqvam, non ut mutari
non possit, sed ut non facile possit.” Worth noting is the similarity of Leibniz’s second definition to
Ulpian’s definition in the Digest 1.1.10: “Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique
tribuendi.”
121 A.6.1.465: “Ius est potentia: Obligatio necessitas: viri boni, qvas Grotius vocat Qvalitates Morales, nihil
sunt aliud qvam qvalitates viri boni.”
122 See §14 and §15 of N.M.
123 According to Busche, (p. 473 fn 169).
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