Stony Brook University

Leibniz adds that this practical perception, which is followed by an act or endeavor, is to
be distinguished from an act of imagination or fiction; for example, if I imagine myself in
the middle of a fire, there is no endeavor to act; but this is of course otherwise if I am in a
real fire. (2.1ab.2) “To know well means to be able to know the activity or passivity of
things, taken in themselves or with other things.” 162 With this definition, stemming from
the definition of the good, Leibniz arrives at one main goal of this definition chain, which
is to establish that “true practical knowledge” consists of the “in-most” (intelligere)
workings of a thing: “Hence it follows that no one thoroughly knows a thing if he is not
most wise or knows universally. For ‘to know well’ is called in Latin ‘to understand’
(intelligere) or ‘to pick out the in-most.’ But ‘understand’ is now carelessly applied to
every kind of knowing.” 163 Leibniz also defines ‘to know’ as “truly to establish or
perceive.” 164 In sum, the entire definition chain begins with love and leads to knowledge.
The good man is one who knows how to love wisely, and to love wisely one must have
thorough knowledge of the very constitution of substances—their power, lack of power
(passion), and endeavor.
(2.1b) A state is an (2.1b.a) aggregate of (2.1b.b) accidents. 165 Accidents are
constituents of a person, such that the definition of ‘felicity’ is ‘the optimal state of the
aggregate of the accidents of a person.’ This definition appears to conflict with Leibniz’s
later accounts of substance, in which a substance has no accidental properties. However,
it is not vital to resolve this conflict at this point.
(2.2) Delight or PLEASURE is the (2.2a) perception (2.2b) of harmony. 166 This
definition again indicates the connection between love (as suggested above) and
motivation, as well as leads to the most fundamental principle of Leibniz’s metaphysics,
i.e., harmony. It would take us too far afield to explain all that is involved in the concept
of harmony. But harmony and goodness are ordered by degrees ranging from delight at
the lowest level to beauty at the highest. The soul is first moved by delight or iucundum
(the agreeable or pleasant) which is “the object of the perceiver’s [sensual] pleasure.” A
higher level of perception (i.e., a more unified, encompassing perception) leads to joy,
which is “a pleasure perceived only by the mind.” Higher yet is Beauty, which is “that
harmony which is clearly and distinctly known, of a kind in which only the harmony of
figures, numbers and movements is perceived.” 167 An example of the merely agreeable is
the gustatory sense, which is not clearly and distinctly known to the mind. Sensual tastes
are subordinate, since they are less clear. “Thus the Sweet is not beautiful.” But, “God,
thought, and eloquent speech we call beautiful.” Nor is beauty to be mistaken for its
popular meaning as “what is agreeable to look at” (A.6.1.484). This explains why Leibniz
says so often, quoting Cicero, that utility and honor coincide. What is good for me is my
delight, but more delightful is beauty, which is found in its highest degree in justice. In
162
A.6.1.484: “Pernoscere est nosse qvid res agere aut pati possit scil. tum per se, tum aliis combinata.”
163
A.6.1.484: “Qvod pernoscere, id latinius dicetur intelligere id est intima legere. Sed intelligendi vox
nunc laxius sumitur pro omni notitia.”
164
A.6.1.484: “Nosse est vere statuere vel sentire.”
165
A.6.1.466: “Status est aggregatum accidentium.”
166
A.6.1.484: “Delectatio seu VOLUPTAS est perceptio harmoniae.”
167
A.6.1.484: “Iucundum est objectum percipientis voluptatem. Gaudium est voluptas sola mente percepta.
Pulchrum est cuius harmonia clare distincteqve intelligitur, qvalis sola est harmonia qvae in figuris numeris
et motibus percipitur.”
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