Stony Brook University

what conforms to the best or perfect in nature, whether that be human nature, or, in the
case of the Stoics, nature in the divine-rational sense, i.e., the logos. Leibniz will maintain
that these views are partly correct, since Aristotle was right about virtue being a natural
human excellence, and since the Stoic logos is simply the natural law of God. At the
same time, for Epicurus the natural law is what is useful to oneself, or “whatever truly
produces pleasure in the soul and tranquility of mind” (A.6.1.342. §71). This too is
agreeable to Leibniz, as long as pleasure does not remain the rule. 86 Leibniz then asserts
as quite sound a principle from Cicero’s De Officiis, that “no one is born for himself, but
is claimed partly by his country, partly his parents, and partly by his friends.” 87 This
seems to express the natural laws of obligation and society we find in Leibniz. Thus, he
agrees with Grotius and Aristotle, against Hobbes, that humans are social by nature
(hominem esse natura socialem). 88 Yet another opinion Leibniz agrees with is that of
Sforza Pallavicino, who held that “the just” is whatever is pleasing to nature, that is,
whatever is beautiful and ordered in the movements of nature. 89 Then, Leibniz again
conveys his understanding of Hobbes. He cites Hobbes’ De Cive Elementa as holding
that the condition of man is either (1) outside of a superior in state of nature, or (2) under
a superior in the civil state. In (1) is the rule of all against all or the right of war; in (2) the
right of nature no longer obtains and the rule becomes “whatever pleases the State.”
Since the state of nature is destructive, everyone is disposed by “sane reason” to pursue
peace in the civil state. 90 Leibniz does not here indicate whether he agrees or disagrees—
perhaps both. As we have seen, Leibniz allows that in a state of nature every person has
the right of war; and that this right is better managed within the State (§17). Thus Leibniz
appears very similar to Hobbes. Yet he seems to differ in two ways: (1) as he has
suggested just above, human social nature tends us toward society, rather than toward a
state of war; 91 (2) although Leibniz holds there is a right of war, it is restricted by
obligation; that is, it is valid only when one’s right is violated. This also implies that the
natural law must not subject us (as Hobbes appears to say) to whatever pleases the State,
especially if this means being subject to abuse by the State. Yet another opinion
mentioned is that of Robert Scharrok, who, like Epicurus, holds that the highest good is
the desire of the heart (or soul). On this view, injustice is due to wrong desires and is
countered by right ones. According to Scharrok, “God has so created our heart that a
86
The role of pleasure for Leibniz is quite important and will be examined in Chapter’s Two, Five, and Six.
Leibniz is much closer to Aristotle and the Stoics. For Aristotle, the “good man” judges rightly what the
true good is in things, whereas “error seems to be due to pleasure, for it appears a good when it is not” (AE
Bk. 3.113b). In addition, the highest good for Aristotle is eudaimonia, not pleasure. For the Stoics, pleasure
is the result of virtue, but not the goal of virtue.
87
Cicero: De officiis, I, 22; De finibus II, 45 (cited by Busche p. 427 fn. 118). In a late revision note (Z. 16-
17) Leibniz adds: “(to which I may have added) God the whole” “(ut ego addiderim) Deus totum.”
88
See De Cive I.2. for Hobbes’ view.
89
Italian Cardinal and Jesuit, b. 1607; d. 1667. Leibniz refers to his book Philosophia moralis seu de Bono
(1646).
90
A.6.1.342.§72: “Th. Hobbes in subtilissimus de Cive Elementis sic procedit: Statum hominum esse vel
extra superiorem, vel sub superiore seu in civitate. Illic esse Jus merum omnium in omnia sed Jus belli, sed
cum status belli sit exitiosus, teneri quemlibet sana ratione duce, ut se disponat ad pacem, statum in una
civitate, quantum in se est, constituta autem civitate simpliciter juris esse quicquid civitati placuit, neque
aliud ibi naturae jus obtinere.”
91
Implying preference to Aristotle’s view of man as a social/political animal, Leibniz cites here John
Felden’s Elementis Jurisprudentiae as having “reduced and refined Aristotle’s principles.”
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