Stony Brook University

ut rather as the perfection or completion of the good. I think it is important to
understand felicity his way—not as the reward for being good but as the accompaniment
that makes virtue its own reward. In any case, soon thereafter Leibniz once again recalls
the original definition of right, in slightly modified form.
Right is the certain power or moral liberty we have to act or not to act;
obligation a veritable necessity. 72
It should be noted that right is no longer defined explicitly as a moral quality, but
is now frequently defined as moral liberty (and necessity). Right is thus
increasingly characterized as the freedom we have to act according to virtue.
After this, the passage continues in the familiar way:
The highest rule of right is to direct everything to the greatest general
good, from whence is born the commonly celebrated three precepts of
right, live honorably, harm no one, give to each his due. The first pertains
to the justice which is called universal, since the life of honor is nothing
other than universal Virtue, or the habit of the soul following reason, so
that the affections are held firm. Indeed since the perfection of the soul
consists in virtue, the more that virtue exerts its influence, the more one is
able to be useful. 73
This passage makes no mention of motives for the three precepts. It conveys the idea, as
did the definition of honestas offered earlier, that justice is a universal virtue because it is
the habit of mind, according to reason, in restraint of the passions, to do what is useful for
everyone. A second version of the passage characterizes the precept “live honorably” as
the precept of right reason. The soul has the virtue to improve, over against the imbecility
of our nature which inclines us to crookedness. 74 To live honorably means to orient the
soul toward virtue.
Having reviewed these passages, it appears more convincing that Leibniz
conceived of right as the prescriptive ground of justice as charity of the wise, and of his
moral philosophy in general. This claim of course conflicts with the prevailing view that
justice, love, happiness, and egoistic motivation form the prescriptive ground. But this
view is maintained I think only by ignoring Leibniz’s actual formulations or by
misunderstanding their significance. With this in mind, we may now turn to the preface to
the Codex Juris Gentium. This preface, as brief as it is, is important to examine since it
72
A.6.4.2863: “Jus quod habemus agendi aut non agendi potentiam quandam sive libertatem moralem esse,
obligationem vero necessitatem.”
73
A.6.4.2864: “Summa juris regula est omnia dirigere ad majus bonum generale, unde tria illa nascuntur
juris praecepta etiam vulgo celebrata, honeste vivere , neminem laedere , suum cuique tribuere . Primum
pertinet ad justitiam ut loquuntur universalem, nam vitae honestas nihil aliud est quam Virtus in universum,
seu habitus animi ad rationem sequendam affectusque continendos obfirmati. Cum enim perfectio animi
consistat in virtute, et tanto quisque magis prodesse possit, quanto magis virtute pollet;”
74
A.6.4.2863: “Est autem honeste vivere , animum virtute excolere, virtusque est habitus animi rectam
rationem sequentis: quemadmodum enim in hac naturae nostrae imbecillitate ad prava inclinati sumus,
affectibus mentem
praevenientibus qui falsorum bonorum specie solicitantur.”
126