Stony Brook University

of pain is itself a pleasure). But pleasure is not sought for any other sake. Therefore,
pleasure is a good in itself. 100 Thus, Leibniz’s argument depends on this descriptive
principle: everything is sought for the pleasure it gives. Let us then call this “condition
(C),” or “the pleasure condition,” and add it to the set of conditions, A and B. So then, of
the two cases, servant and friend, only in friendship is the good, i.e., the pleasure of
another, sought for its own sake. In other words, when I seek the pleasure of my friend, it
is not my pleasure I am seeking, but my friend’s; thus, the pleasure is sought for its own
sake. 101
This however solves only part of the problem. It solves only the means-end
condition, (A). An act is just, if and only if the good sought in the act is not done from the
motive of gaining one’s own good. This has been shown to be possible in the case of
friendship or love. But now the ego condition (B), must be met, and this becomes tricky.
Once again, the pleasure condition (C) is asserted, and then the solution.
In the consensus of mankind everything pleasant in itself is sought after in
itself, and everything sought after in itself is pleasant. We can therefore
readily understand how we can not only achieve the good of others
without our own, but can even seek it in itself; namely, in so far as the
good of others is pleasant to us. A true definition of love can be built from
this. For we love him whose good is our delight. (LL 137) 102
Leibniz repeats the definition of love he first introduced in the investigation of right.
Love is taking pleasure, or delight, in the good of another. When the good of others,
which is a good in itself, i.e., pleasure, is pleasant to us, then we get pleasure from love.
When we love we gain pleasure from the other’s pleasure. Thus the ego condition is
fulfilled, and the paradox appears to be resolved. We can act justly, and we have the
required psychological motive to do so.
But this argument should appear rather unconvincing. We are now supposed to
think that when we seek the pleasure of another we are seeking it only for its own sake.
That is condition A. Yet, at the same time, we get pleasure from doing A; thus condition
B is met. But if I get pleasure from A, then how can my act truly be said to be done for its
own sake? It seems the skeptic may still suspect that we love for the sake of the pleasure
we get from love.
I think Leibniz actually has a better explanation here, which is implied in his brief
reference to Stoic honestas. Between the above two passages, Leibniz launches a brief
but bitter attack on the Stoics, those “cloud-dwellers,” and “enemies of reason,” for
100 It is important to note that Leibniz does not say that pleasure is the only good, or that it is the highest
good. In Chapter Six we will see how Leibniz modifies and qualifies these hedonistic claims.
101 Perhaps this example helps to illustrate. Suppose that I urge my friend to become a jurisconsult. Suppose
I think that it is good to become a jurisconsult. Perhaps my friend, or the world, will be better off with more
jurisconsults. But if this is not my friend’s own end, then it is not an end sought for its own sake. True
friendship is when the good sought is pleasure, but for the ends that are the other’s own. This of course may
be a problem, in case the other does not recognize that his own ends are bad.
102 A.6.1.464: “Consensu generis humani omne jucundum per se expetitur et qvicqvid per se expetitur est
jucundum. Ergo facile intelligi potest, qvomodo bonum alienum non nostrum tantum fieri possit, sed et per
se expetatur, qvoties scilicet jucundum est nobis, bene aliis esse. Unde exstruitur vera definitio amoris;
Amamus enim eum, cui bene esse delectatio nostra est.”
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