Stony Brook University

Vice is the readiness to act badly; or better: the former is the inclination for
the good, and the latter for the bad.
Moral virtue is the virtue of the will.
Justice is the virtue to will what is just (or to cite from ‘virtue,’ since the
good of the will appears to be taken from the just, then) justice will be the
readiness to will what is just. 23
Justice is now the readiness or inclination (both terms are used) to will what is just. Note
that it is not simply the readiness to do what is just, although that is important, but the
readiness to will. When it comes to justice, intention matters.
But now, the definition of the just undergoes a change, and the result is quite
significant. Leibniz addresses two main problems here: (1) if justice is defined in terms of
prudence, and it is supposed that God does not exist, then the just will be whatever can be
sought with impunity. 24 In other words, the just will be whatever one can get away with,
self-interest will be primary, and this cannot be right. (2) On the other hand, if we
consider whether the just is public utility, there is also a problem, since:
it then follows it will not be just to prefer to save myself over a thousand
others; and thus it will be obligatory to offer oneself up for eternal
damnation, so that the well-being of others is attained; which however no
one will say is done by right. 25
In sum, if the just is to be determined by prudence, then the result is too much good for
the individual. If the just is to be determined by public utility, the result is too little good
for the individual. This must mean that some sort of “right” proportion is required.
Leibniz then considers the following:
The just is for each one to do what he would want everyone should do. Or,
so that everyone provides for another, what one would want another to do
for oneself, where this involves wanting from another only as much as one
is prepared to provide to the other. 26
It appears that something like the so-called Golden Rule determines the sought-after
proportion of good. Although here Leibniz makes no grand pronouncement about the
Rule, he will return to it repeatedly, as we will see. Nevertheless, his use of this rule
23 A.6.1.454: “Prudentia est judiciositas circa id qvod bonum malumve est. Virtus est promtitudo bene
agendi. Vitium est promtitudo male agendi, vel potius inclinatio ad bonorum, hoc ad malum. Virtus moralis
est virtus volendi.
Justitia est virtus volendi qvod justum est, vel pro virtutis voce, qvia bene volendi esse ex justi adjecto
apparet, erit justitia promtitudo volendi qvod justum est.”
24 A.6.1.454: “Iustitiam a prudentia definire debeas. An non valde ambiguum est, si ponatur nullus esse
DEUS. Iustum erit, qvicqvid impune sperari potest, si a prudentia definienda justitia est.”
25 A.6.1.454: “Sin non est a prudentia definienda justitia, a qvo ergo, an a bono publico, tunc seqvetur
justum non esse se qvam mille alios salvum malle, ac proinde debebit et aliqvis etiam aeternae damnationi
se offerre, ut aliorum salutem procuret, qvod tamen nemo jure fieri dixerit.”
26 A.6.1.454: “Seu justum est ut faciant singuli qvod factum vellent ab universis. Seu ut qvisqve alii
praestet, qvod vellet ab alio factum sibi, et tantum qvisqve velit ab alio, qvantum eidem praestare paratus
est.”
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