Stony Brook University

out of hope or fear, but by a [right propensity 97 ] of his soul, is so far from
not behaving justly that, on the contrary, he acts more justly than all
others, imitating in a certain way, as a man, divine justice. (RP 72) 98
This view also answers the Euthyphro problem in the Meditation: Just as God sees the
good and loves it by its good nature, we love God by virtue of his good nature. We see
that God’s justice stems from his understanding or reason, and so we love him on that
account—not on account of his capacity for rewarding and punishing us. True piety, then,
consists in the love for God that stems from recognizing that God’s goodness is rational,
that is, rational by nature. But human nature has of course something of God’s reason and
moral power—and the ability to imitate it; and the more we imitate God, the more rightly
we act.
It should also be understood that Leibniz is emphasizing the role of God’s will.
God has not only a rational nature, but the will to do what is just. Now, in actuality
Leibniz does not maintain a strict separation between God’s understanding and God’s
will. Rather, God’s understanding provides a kind of inclination for God to do the good.
When God sees the good, he not only recognizes it, but he is inclined to make it a reality.
Since God is perfect his inclination is always in accord with his reason. In this way God
acts spontaneously, completely determined by his own nature. 99 But we who are not
perfect may be inclined in any number of ways (e.g., by weakness of will, passions, bad
customs, the command of a superior, or lack of knowledge of the good). But those who
possess “true piety” will do their best to imitate God’s perfection, by setting their
inclinations in accord with the principles of morals, the precepts of right reason. Leibniz
here provides an account of moral perfection which dispenses with the motives of fear
and punishment, provides rational grounds for actions, and urges the regulation of the
will by means of the development of virtue following these rational grounds.
However, Leibniz is of course well-known for his accounts of pleasure and
happiness, and he does not leave them out here. Therefore, we must consider whether it is
pleasure, rather than “respect for right and equity,” that provides the reason, that is, the
reason that obligates us, to act with justice. We must also consider that, although several
times he has rejected hope and fear as proper motives of obligation, they still play an
important role.
Whoever, indeed, does good out of love for God or neighbor, takes
pleasure precisely in the action itself (such being the nature of love) and
does not need any other incitement, or the command of a superior; To such
97 Riley has simply ‘inclination.’
98 D 4.280: “Atque hoc etiam non parum ad praxin verae pietatis facit: neque enim sufficit, ita nos Deo
submissos esse, uti etiam tyranno obediremus; nec tantum timendus est ille ob magnitudinem, sed etiam
amandus ob bonitatem; quae non magis a scriptura sacra, quam a recta ratione praecipiuntur. Atque huc
ducunt meliora universalis jurisprudentiae principia, quae etiam cum sana theologia conspirant, & ad veram
virtutem excitant. Tantumque abest, ut, qui non spe aut metu a superiore, sed propensione animi recte agit,
juste non agat, ut ipse potissimum juste agat, quadam divinae justitiae humana imitatione.”
99 This may of course raise the objection that God is necessitated, but not free, to act according to his
nature. This is of course a contentious and well-trodden objection that I cannot take up at the point. Suffice
it to say that Leibniz would say that God is free because completely determined by moral reason. I will
explain this further in Chapter Seven.
234