Stony Brook University

Two begins with reference to “questions of right.”
Most of the questions of right, but particularly of that of sovereigns and of
peoples, are confused, because [not everyone] agrees on a common notion
of justice, with the result that [not everyone] understands the same things
by the same name, and this is the cause of endless dispute. Everyone will
agree, perhaps, to this nominal definition, that justice is a constant will to
act in such a way that no one have a reason to complain of us.[ 58 ] But this
does not suffice unless one gives the means of determining these reasons.
(RM 53) 59
These “reasons for complaint,” in fact, are nearly identical to the graduated “proportions
of good” he had set out all the way back in Draft 2 of the Elementa. 60 To determine these
reasons, Leibniz provides several scenarios designed to move us gradually, in four steps,
from this nominal definition of justice to something like a real definition—i.e., charity of
the wise. This move also involves the first two Roman precepts: beginning with strict
right (harm no one), which requires only refraining from an action, we move to charity or
equity (give each his due), which requires actively promoting another’s good. Moreover,
as Leibniz holds, everyone will recognize these “causes of complaint” as valid
justifications for action. In this way we are also led to the Golden Rule and to justice
defined as charity of the wise. Let us now turn to this four-step continuum from strict
right to charity. 61
Strict right, as we know, does not prescribe anything beyond the prohibition
against harm, at least explicitly. However, to get beyond this prohibition and to reach the
positive good, we must first understand the cause of complaint involved in harm, and it is
very simple. If we harm another, she will hate us; and we would recognize her hate as
justified, since we would hate another for hurting us. Thus, the first cause of complaint:
to harm another; and so we must refrain from harm. But to get to the second step, we
must consider the cause of complaint from harming another indirectly, that is, by refusing
to help another. Suppose that you refuse to help someone in need, and you could do so
without incurring harm to yourself. Would you not be hated for that as well? You may try
to refuse to help others on the grounds that you are content without their help; and you
may remain content as long as others do not harm you. But Leibniz says this will not
work. To conceive of matters rightly, one cannot depend on what one wants (or does not
want), but on what one can rationally imagine. So, you could imagine that if you were in
58 Note that this definition stems in part from the very first sentence of Justinian’s Institutes; but the notion
of “complaint” is Leibniz’s own. Institutionum Lib 1, Tit 1: “Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius
suum cuique tribuens.”
59 M 53: “La plupart des questions du droit, mais surtout de celui des souverains et des peuples sont
embarrassées, parce qu’on ne convient pas d’une notion commune de la justice, ce qui fait qu’on n’entend
pas la même chose sous le même nom, et c’est le moyen de disputer sans fin. On conviendra peut-être
partout de cette définition nominale que la justice est une volonté constant de faire, en sorte que personne
n’ait raison de se plaindre de nous. Mais cela ne suffit pas, si l’on ne donne le moyen de déterminer ces
raisons.”
60 A.6.1.433.
61 An interesting article by Andreas Blank (2004) shows that Leibniz employs “sorites” arguments to make
the move from strict right to equity (charity). Emily Grosholz (1993) argues that Leibniz is relying on his
metaphysical princple of the continuum.
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