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. . . 1. Everything just is possible for one who loves. 2. Everything impossible for one who loves is unjust. 3. Everything impossible for the lover is omissible. 4. Everything unjust is contingent for those who love. 187 The following phrases may be substituted for ‘love of all’: That is, “the one who loves all is one …” 1. who is to enjoy (delectatur) the felicity of all. 2. who perceives (sentit) the harmonious felicity of all. 3. who in the felicity of all perceives identity weighed by difference. 188 . . . The following substitutions also hold: 1. for felicity: ‘optimal state’ 2. For state: ‘totality of accidents’ 3. For totality: ‘multiplicity of all’ 189 In sum, the good person enjoys the optimal states of the multiplicity of accidents of everyone. These theorems and corollaries show how all definitions involving the good person are logically compatible. Leibniz calculates that the sum total of propositions, corollaries and substitutions derivable from the definition of ‘the good man’ is 1,485,600, any of which may be expanded by further consideration. It is unclear why knowing this helps, since it suggests that the demonstrative analysis he has just carried out is vastly incomplete. Nevertheless, his purpose is expressed at the very end of Draft 5: “Since the good person loves everyone, necessarily conflicts of love will always arise, and to clarify the outcome is the purpose of this whole doctrine.” 190 In sum, the purpose is to show that all notions contained in the definition of ‘the good person’ are compatible with the logic of ius. According to Leibniz’s methodology, since all definitions contained within the definition of ‘the good person’ are compatible, then the definition is true. Section 6: Concluding considerations What then does Leibniz accomplish in the Elementa? Leibniz provides an elaborate, if incomplete, response to the initial problem of justice (that justice is folly, since it enjoins us to do another’s good at one’s own expense). In the most general sense, justice means the constant will to bring about the harmonious felicity of everyone; or, the constant will to make one’s own happiness consistent with everyone else’s. His conclusions also point toward his later definition of justice as ‘charity of the wise.’ According to definition, the good person must “know-well” (pernoscere) in order to 187 A.6.1.477 188 A.6.1.477 189 A.6.1.477 190 A.6.1.480: “Qvia cum vir bonus amet omnes, innumerabiles semper concursus amorum oriri necesse est, qvorum eventibus explicandis omnis haec doctrina impendenda est.” 98
perceive and direct the harmonious felicity of all. Leibniz does not indicate how this knowledge may be applied more specifically. Perhaps he thinks, like Aristotle, that no philosophic account of the application of this knowledge is possible, and so it is sufficient to leave the account to the judgment of the good person. The three degrees of right (ius strictum, equity, and piety) might have provided clearer criteria for judgment, but curiously Leibniz has not incorporated them explicitly into the definition of the good person. Nevertheless, Leibniz’s intention to resolve the Carneadean problem and to clarify the terms of right has been quite diligently carried out. We may now turn to René Sève, one of the few commentators to have paid close attention to Leibniz’s notion of ‘the good person.’ His critical remarks provide a useful way of assessing the value of Leibniz’s effort in the Elementa. 191 Nevertheless, I think Sève’s account of the grounds of obligation for Leibniz is not correct. First, Sève claims that Leibniz’s attempt to define what is obligatory for the good man is circular. Leibniz posits in effect that an action is permitted (or obligatory) if it is possible (or necessary) for the good man. Now (the good man) was defined by the fact of accomplishing always and only what is permitted or obligatory. [This amounts to] the inclusion of the definiendum in the definiens, since an action will be permitted (or obligatory) if it can be (or is) accomplished by the individual who accomplishes only permitted and obligatory actions (Sève 110). According to Sève, Leibniz is saying that the good man does what is permitted and obligatory and what defines permitted and obligatory is what the good man does. But this is not correct; Leibniz has defined a permitted action as a just action, which is whatever is compatible with one’s own good and another’s. Also, the good person was defined at length as one who loves everyone, and that in turn is defined as one who promotes universal harmony. These two definitions do not result in a circular definition of what is permitted and obligatory. Interestingly, Sève appears to acknowledge this, although in a rather misleading way. The sole response possible in our eyes consists in taking seriously the idea according to which the good man, or better, the charitable sage, furnishes the criteria of actions just or unjust. In effect we know that for Leibniz ‘objectively good’ is that which augments, or impedes the diminishment of, the perfection of the universe [my emphasis], and that the good man necessarily accomplishes these actions. These last can be then qualified as obligatory and permitted. This observation allows us to refute the circle just exposed. It appears then that the good man is not defined as in a legalistic perspective, by the submission to rules, but inversely the rules are defined in respect to him. In consequence, the inclusion of the definiendum (the permitted or obligatory) in the definiens (the good man) is eclipsed and the circle with it. This solution [however] does not eliminate all the difficulties, as we are going to see. (Sève 110) Thus Sève manages to show how Leibniz avoids the circle that Sève constructed for him. 191 I have translated these passages from Sève’s Leibniz et l’ École moderne du droit naturel, 1989. 99
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Stony Brook University The official
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Copyright by Christopher Lowell Joh
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Abstract of the Dissertation The Sc
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The more power he has, the less lic
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Section 1: Introduction............
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show, however, that pleasure and lo
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CHAPTER ONE: SUBJECTIVE RIGHT AND T
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By a plan for studies we mean a cer
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that for Leibniz the science of jur
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of these sources. In (1) the ground
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etween “fact” on one hand and
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however ‘public utility’ is def
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Grotius’ two significations of
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obligatio. That is, conceptually sp
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one’s own body; furthermore, give
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words, the sense in which God is su
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ight of war and punishment to the S
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qualities are the ground of public
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what conforms to the best or perfec
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Beginning with jus strictum or what
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proportion to contribution, this is
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of equity. 117 Nevertheless, it app
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agrees with the distinction between
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eward or fear of punishment, nor si
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eflecting God’s perfection as muc
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second degrees. As a precept of pie
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of a set of prudential instructions
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In Drafts 5 and 6 Leibniz then appl
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egulated. As we will eventually see
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Page 61 and 62: To see how this passage implies pru
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Page 73 and 74: Prudence, furthermore, cannot be se
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Page 103 and 104: state, but in being unimpeded from
Page 105 and 106: the Meditation Leibniz says that th
Page 107 and 108: will be tacitly understood. Because
Page 109: probability of an action occurring
Page 113 and 114: However, it ought to be recognized
Page 115 and 116: CHAPTER THREE: THE MIDDLE PERIOD: I
Page 117 and 118: deductive system of natural right.
Page 119 and 120: It appears that the “modes of rig
Page 121 and 122: The just—or permitted, forbidden,
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Page 125 and 126: normative character they must be un
Page 127 and 128: Precepts of Right (Leibniz, Digest)
Page 129 and 130: This passage is quite important and
Page 131 and 132: and penalties” but rather are abl
Page 133 and 134: of the three degrees in the same te
Page 135 and 136: It is interesting that Leibniz defi
Page 137 and 138: And since charity is the habit of l
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Page 141 and 142: What must not be overlooked is that
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Page 151 and 152: CHAPTER FOUR: LEIBNIZ’S DEMONSTRA
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that Leibniz has used for various p
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necessary truths, but are contingen
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defines definition in the following
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Another example of the difference i
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It will be further asked what the g
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possible; but this does not show th
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Leibniz’s argument is this: To ma
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notion of probability, which they h
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quasi-platonic essences (residing i
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arguments on innateness, we discove
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manifest proofs that they are not i
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in mathematics, the measures of rig
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egulating our practice. (E 1.2.3) I
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senses what joy and sorrow are. (NE
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follows where we left off on page 8
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As Leibniz has argued similarly in
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It is not quite clear what he means
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just because a principle is not kno
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not have distinct knowledge of its
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actions and the goodness or evil th
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Essais. These sources, as he says t
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Leibniz cites a number of instincts
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our passions and our present concer
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The ordinary use of the word ‘pro
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state, constitute [natural right];
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ecognizes how the senses can obscur
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proposition; rather, possessing a v
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CHAPTER SIX: MONITA AND MEDITATION:
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committing crimes with impunity. Ul
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In the science of [right], rather,
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i.e., that she is the author of her
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sufficient to establish the obligat
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This notion of “complaint” will
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It is agreed that whatever God will
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terminology, Leibniz holds that nat
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different matter, but if it [occurs
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need of help, and another who easil
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‘equality,’ considered as “co
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such a way that no one has a reason
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excused from showing benevolence to
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this. In any case, the real problem
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This means that the slave should be
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its efficient cause in the divine i
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a degree is it repugnant to reason
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external principle that compels God
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again at last to the Ciceronian for
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as equity; justice as love) were de
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CHAPTER SEVEN: NECESSITY, OBLIGATIO
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Thus in the Theodicy Leibniz uses m
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incapable of demonstrations. A scie
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Furthermore, we must not forget tha
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perceived to be the good. 24 Howeve
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Several points are notable here: Fi
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find the eternal rules of goodness
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Accordingly, the perfection of the
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an account of virtue. This shows, o
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H Hobbes, Thomas. 1651. Leviathan.
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Studia Leibniziana. Band 22. vol.2.
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Reiner, Hans. 1977. “Die Goldene
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