Stony Brook University

whole, the vir bonus of the Elementa has become the sapientis of the Meditation. The
good person whose possession of the moral qualities enabled her to “love everyone,” has
come to possess the virtue enabling her to love everyone wisely. Although wisdom means
“the science of felicity,” it also means the knowledge and will to act according to the
rules of equality and equity.
Section 4: Features of Leibniz’s Golden Rule
Since Leibniz offers a rather unique version of the Golden Rule, and since he
offers some clarifying remarks on his use of it, a closer look is warranted. Here is the rule
once more:
What you do not wish to have done to you, or what you do wish to have
done to you, do not do to others, or do not deny to others. 77
This version of the rule appears to be historically unique. It is found only here in the
Meditation. It is not in the Bible, in Roman law, or anywhere else. Both Mollat and Riley
refer this rule in Leibniz’s text to Matt. 7:12 and Luke 6:31. But those verses express only
the positive form of the Rule. 78 As some commentators have noted, Leibniz’s version
expresses both the negative and positive forms. 79 However, the positive form that it
expresses is slightly different from the usual positive forms. It does not say ‘what you
want done to yourself do to others, but rather, ‘what you want done to yourself do not
deny to others.’ This formulation actually has a distinct logical advantage: you cannot do
to others what you want done to yourself; you may only not deny them what you allow
yourself. In this way, others have the right to refuse the sorts of things you wish for
yourself, if they so wish. 80
We might however be wary of using anything like the Golden Rule as a criterion
for just actions, since there have long been valid and strong criticisms of it. Kant’s
criticisms in the Grundlegung, of the negative version, are particularly noteworthy, in
part because Leibniz seems to have anticipated them somewhat. Kant writes:
Let it not be thought that the banal quod tibi non vis fieri, etc., could here
serve as a guide or principle, for it is only derived from the principle [the
moral law] and is restricted by various limitations. It cannot be a universal
law, because it contains the ground neither of duties to one’s self nor of
the duties of [beneficence] to others (for many a man would gladly
consent that others should not benefit him, provided only that he might be
77 M 57: “quod tibi non vis fieri, aut quod tibi vis fieri, neque aliis facito aut negato.”
78 From the Vulgate: “quaecumque vultis ut faciant vobis homines et vos facite eis,” (do to others whatever
you would have them do to you). The first part of Leibniz’s rule expresses the negative version, which does
not appear in the NT but in OT (Tobit 4:16) and in the Regula Benedicti and Regula Magistri.
79 See Brown, 1995, pp. 436-7.
80 For example, under the traditional positive form of the rule a masochist could say, absurdly, ‘I want to be
harmed, so, I should harm others.’ However, under Leibniz’s version the masochist cannot say this. He
could only say,“I want to be harmed, therefore, I cannot deny to another the same desire to be harmed.”
That means the masochist can harm another only if another consents. So, the masochist cannot use his
desire to justify his treatment of others.
226