Stony Brook University

showed in the Elementa, love (or what he refers to here as the supreme conatus 12 ) is the
means for fulfilling the obligation as determined by the definition of right. Love is the
fulfillment of right and obligation, since it provides the right kind of motive, i.e., that
which enables one to act simultaneously for the good for oneself and for another. But
love is not itself the ground of obligation.
Secondly, by mentioning love, the good person, and wisdom, the passage comes very
close to defining justice as charity of the wise. Although justice is not mentioned in the
passage, we can recall that Leibniz found love to be the nature of justice, and that the
“good person” loves everyone in the most harmonious way, which means according to
need and merit and without harming oneself.
However, it was not until five years later that Leibniz first expressed his definition of
justice as charity of the wise. 13 This occurred in a letter to one of his frequent
correspondents, Herzog Johann Friedrich, in May of 1677. At the close of a series of brief
remarks on a variety of topics, Leibniz writes, “I have discovered a secret inspiration.
Demonstrations of natural jurisprudence out of this sole principle: justice is the charity of
the wise.” 14 He does not explain how he came up with this new definition, but we can
assume that it was already implied in the Elementa. In a later series of papers Leibniz
attempted to work out this definition. In order to see how right forms the conceptual basis
for justice as charity of the wise, we will now examine several of these papers.
Section 3: The late 1670’s: Right, right reason, and justice as caritas sapientis
The first paper to consider is titled (by the Akademie) “Modalia et Elementa Juris
Naturalis” (1678). Overall, it attempts to establish the means for a “rightly ordered”
justice. Of course, if justice is a virtue, then it must be a moderating disposition. But the
question is, what is the rule for this moderation? Since wisdom is not mentioned here, the
moderation seems to come from the “juris modalia” that were first introduced in the
Elementa.
Justice is rightly ordered charity, or virtue serving reason in the affections
toward others endowed with reason. The good person is one who is
endowed with justice. Every prudent person is a good person.
The owed necessary
Not-owed (is what for the good man is) contingent
Permitted possibile
Forbidden impossibile.
Thus all propositions of modal logic can here be transferred. 15
12
Conatus is a very important concept and needs to be investigated; but it can be recalled that the Elementa
defined it as “the beginning of action” (“Conatus est initium actionis” A.6.483). At one point he had
defined justice as the constant conatus for the common felicity while saving oneself (“Iustitia est constans
conatus ad felicitatem communem salva sua” A.6.1.454).
13
As recorded by Grua, pp. 203 and 211 in Jurisprudence Universelle et Théodicée selon Leibniz.
14
A.1.2.23: “Habe das arcanum motus gefunden. Demonstrationes de jurisprudentia naturali ex hoc solo
principio: quod justitia sit caritas sapientis.”
15
A.6.4.2758: “Justitia est charitas recte ordinata seu virtus servans rationem in affectu erga alios
ratione praeditos. Vir bonus est qui justitia praeditus est. Omnis prudens est vir bonus.
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