Stony Brook University

actions and the goodness or evil they imply, then we are more capable of judging in a
truly equitable manner.
This implies that what is just is not to be determined on the basis of what anyone
wants or wills, but rather by an independently discernible standard of the just. That is
because desires are difficult to control and measure. Although he does not point this out,
Leibniz could in fact quite readily supply a standard for the Golden Rule based on the
definition of right and its derivations. To want “too much” means to fail to limit one’s
power over others, to take what is not “one’s own,” and to neglect or fail to promote the
good of others. All of these things are implied in the definitions of right. If the place of
others and the Golden depend on a just will, then there is no will more just than one that
is based on the definitions of right. Leibniz does not avail himself of these positions in
the Nouveaux Essais. But in Chapter Six we will encounter a different version of the
Golden Rule, one which corresponds closely to the precepts of right.
It should be noted that Leibniz has so far indicated at least two ways in which
reason, more than instinct, provides certainty about moral doctrine. For one, reason leads
us from joy to rational happiness; secondly, reason provides clarification, not only of the
inclinations of instinct, but of the rules related to justice, such as the Golden Rule. We
will see more of this kind of clarification, and mixture, in what follows. In fact, the main
result of the following passages is to show that the main function of the instincts is to
motivate us to do what is normatively required by “the natural law” (la loi naturelle). It
will be important to distinguish two sources of natural law, Biblical and Roman, as we
will see. 56
At this point in the dialogue, Locke is shown to cite numerous examples of moral
irregularities, which collectively are supposed to show that moral relativism reigns
supreme. People lack remorse for their misdeeds (which proves that innate conscience is
ineffective); various nations practice exposure of their children, or geld them for fattening
and eating, maintain young concubines for this purpose, and then eat the mothers when
they are too old to breed; and in Egypt, a man is considered holy if he refrains from
sleeping with women and boys, but sleeps rather with asses and mules. Leibniz responds
by pointing out that there are many factors that obscure “the natural law,” but this counts
nothing against its universality and innateness. His first move is to focus on what can be
determined by reason.
Setting instincts aside, like the one which makes us pursue joy and flee
sorrow, moral knowledge [science] is innate in just the same way as
arithmetic is, for it too depends upon demonstrations provided by the inner
light. (NE 1.2.9.92) 57
Here again Leibniz sets sense instincts aside and speaks of “moral science” as
comparable with arithmetic. Moral science and arithmetic are both are innate because
56 Note: the English translation uses ‘natural law’ to translate both of what Leibniz distinguishes. When
referring to the natural law of the Gospels, Leibniz uses the term “la loi naturelle”; whereas, when referring
to the Roman law of the Digest or Institutes, he uses “le droit naturel.”
57 A.6.6.92: “La science Morale (outre les instincts comme celuy qui fait suivre la joye et fuir la tristesse)
n’est pas autrement innée que l’Arithmetique. Car elle depend aussi des demonstrations que la lumiere
interne fournit.”
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