Stony Brook University

in the will, i.e., a dominant passion or habit. Given this possibility of moral failure,
reason alone cannot compel us, but only guide us. To be just, one must develop the habit
of conforming one’s will to the true propositions of right, which is to say, one must
develop the virtue of justice. We are obliged, then, not only by the true meanings of the
just, but by our moral-rational nature, by the very capacity we have for justice.
Leibniz has maintained, since his initial formulation of the science of right, the
idea that the moral qualities with which we are endowed enable us to be moral beings,
i.e., to harmonize our ends with the ends of all other moral beings. This capacity has
always implied that to be a moral agent entails self-limitation or self-mastery of the soul.
This self-limitation, I suggest, may also be called autonomy. A certain, qualified, notion
of autonomy, often cited by the modern natural lawyers, can be found in Romans 2: 15,
which says that when we act by nature according to the law, we are “a law unto
ourselves.” This is, however, not a fully developed notion of autonomy, since it is tied to
instinctual motives. 116 Leibniz’s science of right, however, leads us to a second nature,
that is, to virtue, bringing us close to a fully developed notion of autonomy or self-rule.
According to this, to be determined by one’s own capacity for limiting one’s natural
power, is just what it means to be a law unto oneself. In essence, this capacity is the
capacity for a free will. A free will for Leibniz is not something that we have from the
beginning. As self-rule, freedom is a function of the degree to which one determines
oneself by moral principles. As we have seen, we are most free when we are most
determined by right reasons. 117
In the final chapter we will see more clearly how freedom and determination are
related in Leibniz’s account of metaphysical and moral necessity. For two questions may
arise in light of our conclusions: Is there any sense in which God is obligated, and if so,
can we make sense of this being’s so-called freedom? These questions will be addressed
in the final chapter.
116 The concept of autonomy can be taken in a number of ways. For an excellent account of historical
notions of autonomy and their development, see Schneewind (1998).
117 Letter to Wedderkopf (1671): “Quod nihil detrahit libertati. Summa enim libertas est ad optimum a recta
ratione cogi, qui aliam libertatem desiderat stultus est” (A.2.1.186).
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