Stony Brook University

Another version of this paper has some interesting variations which further highlights
the centrality of subjective right: it begins “jurisprudence or right about which we are
concerned is the science of the good person. 64 Right is then defined as “what we have to
act or not to act, which is a certain power or moral liberty. Obligation is however a moral
necessity, without doubt imposed on those who wish to retain the name of the good
person.” 65 It is clear from this that to be a good person means to have the power or
freedom to act rightly. Obligation is rooted in this power. That we have this power
imposes on us the obligation to use it in accordance with universal benevolence—or
common felicity.
Because however the good man is benevolent toward all, even better is to
recognize the virtue of the perfection of the soul. Consequently, the
highest rule of right is that everything is directed to the greatest general
good or common felicity; this is to be understood in terms of three other
general precepts. 66
So, then, the good person is one who possesses the right of directing her actions to the
common felicity. This common felicity is then directed (and perfected) by the precepts of
right. These determine the good that is to be done; they are not derived from a notion of
the good. Notably, this definitional structure does not indicate any motives whatsoever.
Nor are motives indicated in the brief account he goes on to give of the three degrees. As
is usual, the first precept is associated with commutative justice or arithmetic equality,
and distributive justice is described as equality among unequals, or geometrical
proportion. In this way “the habits or reasons of persons among themselves may be equal
to the condition of things which are divided among them.” 67 This statement essentially
defines equity (which is the name of the precept for distributive justice) which consists of
a consensus among rational agents regarding the distribution of goods. This idea is better
conveyed in the Codex, as we will see. But what this brief definitional structure shows is
that the concepts of right constitute the normative foundation for the common felicity.
The following two papers are quite notable since they suggest that jus is the
starting point from which caritas sapientis is derived. But also quite interesting is how
Leibniz distinguishes jus from law.
Right, with which we are concerned, is the science of the good and the
equitable. For, the good man is one who loves everyone; however, when
several interests are in conflict, the dispositions of a man toward man must
be moderated by reason, and so must fall back to a certain measure of
equality; thus we may place the true reward not in things but in persons.
64 A.6.4.2850: “Jurisprudentia , sive jus in quo versamur est scientia viri boni.”
65 A.6.4.2850: “Itaque jus quod habemus agendi vel non agendi, est potentia quaedam sive libertas moralis.
Obligatio autem est moralis necessitas, illi nimirum imposita, qui viri boni nomen tueri velit.”
66 A.6.4.2851-2: “Quoniam autem vir bonus est qui benevolus est erga omnes, eo tamen magis quo
majorem in unoquoque virtutem id est animi perfectionem agnoscit, consequens est, Summam Juris
Regulam esse, ut omnia dirigantur ad maximum bonum generale sive communem felicitatem; haec in tria
alia generalia praecepta scinditur.”
67 A.6.4.2852: “ut habitus sive ratio personarum inter se, sit aequalis habitudini rerum quae ipsis
tribuuntur.”
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