Stony Brook University

Leibniz has already revealed the “scandal” of voluntarism. Yet he invites his own scandal
by invoking Grotius’ notorious claim that even if God did not exist, a “natural obligation”
would still apply. 32 His point is that without God, there are still duties that follow from
the natural right of self-preservation and well-being. Now, while these rights appear to
impose only a prudential obligation (and arguably, an obligation to serve one’s own selfinterest
is no real obligation), this is not the whole of Leibniz’s view. 33 As he says in the
next sentence, “although, as I have observed, a natural law based on this source alone
would be very imperfect” (RP 71). 34 This refers to his earlier statement, where he
criticized Pufendorf for limiting the end of natural right to this life alone, thus making it
valid for atheists. In view of this comment, then, Leibniz must temper his criticism of
Pufendorf, since he believes that the fear of divine punishment is a powerful obligator,
especially in the long term. This also means that Leibniz cannot wholly subscribe to
Grotius’ notorious claim. 35 Yet a better explanation for Leibniz’s comment can be found
elsewhere. As we have seen, the rules of natural right cannot be made exclusive to
individual communities, such as a society of robbers, but must be valid for a universal
community, at all times. 36
Despite these concessions, Leibniz makes a striking counterpoint that gets to the
heart of his own grounds of natural right: God is just, most just, precisely because he has
no superior.
To pass over all this, one must pay attention to this fact: that God is
praised because he is just. There must be, then, a certain justice—or rather
a supreme justice—in God, even though no one is superior to him, and he,
by the spontaneity of his excellent nature, accomplishes all things well,
such that no one can reasonably complain of him. (RP 71) 37
ut taceam, quod Grotius bene notavit, fore aliquam naturalem obligationem, etsi daretur, quod dari non
potest, Deum nullum esse, aut licet divina existentia seponatur tantisper; quoniam certé multa ab hominibus
erga alios exigit propriae conservationis commoditatisque cura; quae Hobbius etiam pro parte annotavit; &
hoc obligationis vinculum latronum societates exemplo suo confirmant, dum aliis hostes, inter se quaedam
officia colere coguntur.”
32 Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, prolegomena, sec. 11.
33 For Grotius the natural law tells us how to manage the conflict between our natural sociability and our
own benefit (paraphrasing Schneewind, IA p. 73) but this is not equivalent to saying that the natural law
directs us simply to self-preservation, as it is for Hobbes—nor is it for Leibniz.
34 D 4.280: “quamquam, ut jam notavi, imperfectum fit valde jus naturae, quod ex hoc solo fluat.”
35 Leibniz’s agreement with Grotius on this point must be considerably qualified. In Theodicy (sec. 183-4),
quoting and paraphrasing Bayle, Leibniz endorses the view of Aquinas and Grotius that we are “justified in
saying that if there were no God we should nevertheless be obliged to conform to the natural law.” Yet, he
continues, “one must not say, with some Scotists, that the eternal verities would exist even though there
were no understanding, not even that of God. For it is, in my judgment, the divine understanding which
gives reality to the eternal verities, albeit God’s will have no part therein. All reality must be founded on
something existent. It is true that an atheist may be a geometrician: but if there were no God, geometry
would have no object. And without God, not only would there be nothing existent, but there would be
nothing possible.”
36 See Nouveaux Essais p.89, quoted in Chapter Five, sec. 3.
37 D 4.280: “haec, inquam, ut taceam, sciendum est, Deum ipsum laudari, quod justus est, adeoque esse
quandam, immo potius esse summam ipsus Dei justitiam; etsi superiore careat, & sponte naturae excellentis
onmia bene agat, ut nemo de eo cum ratione queri possit.”
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