Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
Nevertheless, the outset of hostilities proved anything but favorable to
Allied air operations.
Substantially adding to Anglo-French difficulties was the fact that the
command and control system failed to function on May 10th. Not until
eleven in the morning on that day did Allied air commanders receive
authority to attack German columns and airfields and then with the admonition
that they were “at all cost to avoid bombing built up areas.064 The
delay in releasing the air forces to attack even military targets reflected the
failure of Allied political leadership to act decisively even when confronted
with the terrible reality of German opening moves. By and large, the RAF’s
forces in France confined themselves to flying cover for the British Expeditionary
Force (BEF) as it moved into Belgium. It saw little of the Luftwaffe,
largely because the Germans had no intention of interfering with a
move that so obviously played into their hands.
Unfortunately, virtually all of the Luftwaffe’s operational records were
destroyed at the end of the war. Consequently, it is impossible to determine
exactly how the Germans allocated their air resources for the campaign in
the west. Nonetheless, the overall conduct of the first weeks of the campaign
do suggest a general pattern to German air operations. The first strategic
objective of Luftwaffe operations was to destroy or at least severely
impair the Allied air base structure, thus rendering it difficult for the enemy
air forces to intervene against the movement forward of the German Army.
These German bomber and long-range fighter attacks do not seem to have
received substantial support from the Bf-109 force. Rather, the German
single-engine fighter force seems to have been engaged largely in screening
and protecting the movement forward of the armored force through the
Ardennes. Some of the fighter force also engaged in straight out air-to-air
missions to seek out and destroy enemy fighters and bombers.65 Neither the
fighters nor the twin-engine bomber force engaged in close-air-support missions
for the Army. Only the Stuka force flew that mission profile and then
largely in support of the breakthrough along the Meuse on May 13. After
the breakthough at Sedan, the Stuka force reverted to the air interdiction
mission, as it possessed very limited capability in 1940 to perform close air
support in a mobile environment.@
At the same time that the Luftwaffe’s bombers and fighters were striking
Allied airfields and the support structure, Bf-109s were making an
intense effort to sweep the skies over the Ardennes of Allied reconnaissance
aircraft and bombers that might give away the main direction of the
Schwerpunkt emphasis. Only the RAF appears to have made a sustained
effort in the Ardennes region, and strong Luftwaffe forces in the area
inflicted crippling casualties on the British. On May 10, four waves of
Battle bombers covered by six Hurricanes attempted to strike German
columns in the Ardennes. Of thirty-two Battles, the Germans managed to
shoot down thirteen and damage the remaining nineteen. On the llth,
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