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Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

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LESSONS BEFORE WOR .D WAR<br />

The He<strong>in</strong>kel He-111 bomber.<br />

Much <strong>of</strong> this thought rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>ternal to military circles, as Hitler and his<br />

political leaders saw a different use for <strong>the</strong> Luftwaffe <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> diplomatic<br />

arena outside <strong>of</strong> war.h5<br />

From <strong>the</strong> German reoccupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rh<strong>in</strong>eland <strong>in</strong> 1936 through <strong>the</strong><br />

Munich agreement to dismember Czechoslovakia two years later, Hitler’s<br />

deft use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Luftwaffe’s potential to reduce Europe’s great cities to rubble<br />

and kill large numbers <strong>of</strong> civilians quieted foreign opposition to a whimper.<br />

Germany’s rumored air strength became a vital partner <strong>in</strong> Nazi<br />

diplomatic <strong>in</strong>itiatives. Most <strong>of</strong> it was bluff, but it worked. Despite two years<br />

<strong>of</strong> warn<strong>in</strong>g from French military attaches <strong>in</strong> Berl<strong>in</strong>, senior French air <strong>of</strong>ficials<br />

drew conclusions from personal observation at maneuvers and visits<br />

to German factories. Their view was based not on statistics, but visual<br />

pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> superior German aviation technology. Yet, as one German general<br />

admitted years later:<br />

In addition to <strong>the</strong> systematic bluff at top levels. <strong>the</strong>re was also <strong>the</strong> will<strong>in</strong>g selfdeception<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> foreign air observers, who simply refused to believe what <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

eyes saw and <strong>in</strong>sisted on assum<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong>re was still more hidden beh<strong>in</strong>d it. They<br />

had no way <strong>of</strong> know<strong>in</strong>g that many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> gigantic hangers <strong>the</strong>y were shown were<br />

ei<strong>the</strong>r completely empty or filled with ancient, dust-covered aircraft.hh<br />

In general, a pacifistic West believed <strong>the</strong> chimera <strong>of</strong> Hitler’s air armada<br />

largely because <strong>of</strong> its own psychological and material unpreparedness to do<br />

o<strong>the</strong>rwise. In a strange twist to post-World War I1 deterrence, <strong>the</strong> Luftwaffe<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> late 1930s effectively countered any Anglo-French notions <strong>of</strong><br />

35

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