Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

KOREA
ber of MacArthur’s staff. During World War 11, Stratemeyer had commanded
Army air forces in Asia, first in India and Burma, and then, after
the spring of 1945, in China.‘O He drew on his wartime experience in recommending
to General MacArthur on July 8, 1950, that FEAF be given
operational control over all Air Force and naval air units operating from
Japan or over Korea.” The previous day, Stratemeyer had appointed
FEAF’s Vice Commander, Maj. Gen. Earle E. Partridge, Commander of
Fifth Air Force and given Partridge the mission of gaining and holding air
superiority over Korea.’* On July 11, Stratemeyer met with his Navy counterpart,
Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy, in an effort to form the unified command
that he had recommended to MacArthur. The product of that meeting was
a directive which pledged the staffs of the Navy and FEAF commanders to
“coordination control,” a phrase which held different meaning for FEAF
and Navy commanders.13 Stratemeyer in fact did not gain the theater-wide
control of U.N. air assets which he had requested; indeed, such powers
were never given FEAF during the war, and Stratemeyer and his successor,
Lt. Gen. Otto I? Weyland, were compelled to rely primarily upon their personal
relationships with Navy Far East Force commanders to insure interservice
coordination of air efforts.14
Stratemeyer also had problems with General MacArthur’s staff. On
July 16, 1950, MacArthur’s headquarters formed a target committee to
allocate air strikes against North Korean military, industrial, and transportation
target^.'^ General Weyland, who replaced General Partridge as
FEAF’s Vice Commander, had commanded tactical air units in World War
I1 and recognized immediately that MacArthur’s headquarters lacked adequate
Air Force and Navy representation.I6 He and Stratemeyer were able
to convince MacArthur to expand the headquarters target committee to
include senior FEAF personnel. After six weeks, the headquarters committee
was replaced by one staffed and organized by FEAEI’ Though invited
to participate, the Navy declined. Even without Navy membership, however,
the Formal Target Committee of the Far East Air Forces served as an
effective means of coordinating the U.N. air effort against North Korea and
then against North Korean and Chinese air forces.18 In the case of joint
operations, such as the amphibious assault on Inchon in September 1950
that led to the liberation of Seoul, joint Air Force, Navy, and Marine committees
met beforehand to divide combat air patrol, reconnaissance, and
air interdiction responsibilities. It was not the system that Generals Stratemeyer
and Weyland had pressed for, but it was one which, with Navy cooperation,
they could-and did-learn to live with.
With the immediate threat posed by North Korean air units suppressed,
the Fifth Air Force, augmented by the newly formed FEAF
Bomber Command (three bomb groups), turned to assisting the U.S. and
South Korean forces then under heavy pressure from mechanized North
Korean ground units. Seoul had fallen to North Korean troops on June 28;
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