Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
Limited in his purchases by the decision in favor of quality rather than
quantity, and constrained by the reluctance of the General Staff to go too
far with an unproven concept, Tolkovsky needed to make the best possible
use of what he had. He introduced pilot standards which were the stiffest
in the world. Initial selection was (and is) unbelievably rigorous; and
“washout” rates were (and are) in the region of 90 percent.’? Tolkovsky’s
successor as Air Force Commander “once pinned pilot’s wings on a single
cadet, the only one who successfully completed the course,” according to
the British historian, Edgar 0’Ballan~e.l~ Nor was the psychological aspect
neglected. Ezer Weizman has recorded that when a pilot trainee
reaches where he can fly at forty thousand feet, we send him up one night between
nine and ten o’clock, tell him not to look down as he rises. He climbs to ten ...
twenty ... thirty ... forty thousand. Then we say. ‘look down.’ And what does he see?
The whole of Israel a pearly blaze, humming with life. and around it the Arab states
in glum darkness, with only here and there the barest glimmer of light. When he sees
that, he becomes a Jewish pi10t.I~
Less romantically, Tolkovsky also started a program of modern radar
acquisition, bringing in the first set shortly before the 1956 conflict. He set
about maximizing his limited resources through improved aircraft serviceability
rates (often, if not always, over 90 percent) and “skilled and devoted
ground-crews, who refuel and rearm the plane at record speeds.”” Still
remaining was the matter of tactics-of how to get the maximum possible
value from this increasingly finely tuned organization.
In Spain, during the late 1930s, the German Luftwaffe had developed a
combat formation for fighters based on the Rotte, or pair, in which the
wingman flew very slightly behind his leader, the latter initiating and carrying
through all attacks with the wingman’s primary duty being to cover
his leader’s tail. Subsequently, in World War 11, the British and Americans
adopted this principle, generally using two such pairs in a “finger four”
formation, so-called because the four aircraft flew in the same relationship
to each other as the fingertips of an outstretched hand. The USAF continued
this tactical formation in Korea. However, the Luftwaffe had ended its
war flying two machines abreast, so that by concentrating his search inward
each pilot could watch the blind spots of his partner, behind and below him.
Still, in an attack, the leader’s business was with the chosen target, the
wingman’s mission essentially to hold his position and cover his usually
more experienced leader. Thus, in either “finger four” or “line abreast,”
two aircraft formed a “welded wing,”I6 two machines flying as one in a
shooter/cover relationship rather like that of a boxer who always leads with
his left and uses his right to protect himself.
But good boxers hit with both hands and the best throw rapid combinations
at their opponents from time to time. Occasionally, in World War I1
and Korea, experienced Allied pilots had rejected the tactical rigidity of the
“welded wing” and flown their missions two abreast, covering each other
and maneuvering independently in a coordinated, mutually supporting
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