Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
for 26 British. But, in September 1940, the crux of the matter for Goering
was that the Luftwaffe had failed to gain air superiority. His boast had come
to nought. Hitler postponed Operation SEA LION indefinitely. There would
be no further blitzkrieg in the West, no invasion of Britain.
Recommendations Based on Experience
At the time he left No. 11 Group, after only seven months in command,
Keith Park submitted to Dowding a number of important recommendations
based on his experiences. Dowding endorsed many of these in forwarding
the report to the Under Secretary of State for Air, Harold Balfour, on
November 15, 1940. Among the conclusions reached by the two commanders
were the following.
The more the enemy bombers were attacked, the more they were surrounded
with fighters. It became increasingly difficult to distinguish in the
early-warning stages between bombers and fighters. Moreover, as the
incoming formations increased their altitudes, No. 11 Group’s fighters had
to be withdrawn from forward airfields in order to have more time to climb,
so as not to be jumped at a disadvantage before they reached altitude. In
spite of theory, radar proved inadequate for the higher altitudes, and in
early October standing patrols had to be instituted of single, and then
paired, Spitfires to provide extra warning time. Park noted that each time
the RAF changed its procedures in such ways as these, the enemy’s losses
increased and No. 11 Group’s decreased.)”
Other apparently mundane arrangements were also important. After
the bombing of the airfields, the aircraft were dispersed, but neither additional
motor vehicles nor telephones were supplied quickly enough to handle
the resulting decentralization. Another result of the increasing intensity
of operations was the need to abandon the old system of training new pilots
in squadrons. Squadrons in quiet sectors had to be combed for experienced
pilots, and these people received no rest.
Perhaps the most important development for the future of RAF fighters
lay in the adoption of the finger-four formation and the shift to a squadron
organization of three flights of four machines. Park concluded that what
was needed was a 400 mile-per-hour aircraft with 4 cannon and a service
ceiling of 40,000 feet, and squadrons commanded by men under 24 years of
age, as older men were less successful at withstanding the exhausting pressure.
He recommended better training in defensive tactics, in flying formation
through clouds, in gaining height in the presence of the enemy, and the
like, as well as reduced continuous service time.
Dowding, who maintained that the Battle of Britain lasted through the
fighter-bomber phase in October, concluded, among other things, that the
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