Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

LUFTWAFFE AGAINST POLAND
now concentrated behind Pas de Calais under the control of Kesselring’s
Second Air Force. 127 While this decision provided greater support to the
attacks on Fighter Command bases defending London, the decision effectively
removed the Third Air Force from the daylight offensive and took
the pressure off much of Southern England. The pressure of sustained
operations was beginning to tell on both sides. Neither fighter force was in
a position to take such losses on a sustained basis. (See Table 2-3)
The bad weather ended on August 24; three weeks of intensive
operations then began. For the first two weeks, the Luftwaffe’s target
remained Fighter Command and its support structure. The Germans
placed enormous pressure on the defense system. And while they did
not inflict daily losses as high as they had in mid-August, they did push
the British fighter forces to the limit. Luftwaffe bomber formations
thoroughly devastated Fighter Command’s frontline airfields and seriously
stressed not just British pilots but also the command and control system
and the maintenance support force. Reserves of pilots on both sides were
running out. But if the British were under extraordinary pressure, the
Germans saw no relaxing in the defenses. Fighter Command’s resistance
proved as tenacious as ever.
TABLE 2-3
Fighter Pilot Losses:
RAF Fighter Command and Luftwaffe
RAF Fighter Command
(Hurricanes and Spitfires)
Luftwaffe
(Bf-109 force)
Total Losses Percent* Total losses Percentt
all causes Losses of all causes Losses of
Pilots
Pilots
July 84 10% 124t 11%
Aug 237 26% 168 15%
Sept 276 28% 229 23.1%
*based on # of pilots available at the beginning of the month
t may include some late returns from the Battle of France
Source: The figures for British losses are based on the combat loss tables for July, August and September
in Mason, Battle over Britain and on the tables he provides on Fighter Command’s establishment for July
1, August 1, and September I. The Luftwaffe figures are based on the tables available in BAIMA, RL 707,
708 Gen. Qu.6 Abt. (I), Ubersicht uber SOIL Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft. Verluste und Reserven der
Biegenden Verbande. It is worth noting that the combat loss results available in Mason places the Luftwaffe
fighter pilot losses at a significantly lower level: they would be July, 45 pilots, 4 percent: August
175; 15.7 percent: and September 177, 17.8 percent. Only the figures for July are wildly at variance and
may reflect late returns from the Battle of France in the BAlMA RL 700 series.
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