Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

OPERATION OVERLORD
squadrons while a P-47 relay of three squadrons flew high cover. The
whole of VIII Fighter Command-the long- range escort fighters-flew
perimeter patrols outside the battle area. Leigh-Mallory held back a
reserve of some thirty fighter squadrons, with six at the highest state of
readiness for instant commitment to threatened areas. The defense of the
shipping lanes and of the beaches at night was in the hands of ADGB and
RAF No. 85 Group.”6
AEAF laid on a host of offensive measures as well. As a preliminary
step AEAF had begun to attack the German long- range aircraft warning
and reporting stations as early as May 10. On May 17, these raids were
extended to the night fighter control stations. RAF 2d TAF attacked some
forty-two sites in the last week of May. RAF Bomber Command raided the
four highly important jamming stations located in the west on the night of
June 3/4. That night, ninety-five heavies from Bomber Command, using
markers laid by Oboe-controlled Mosquitos, completely took out the Luftwaffe’s
wireless intercept station for northwest France. Two combined air
and naval diversions employing elaborate electronic “spoofing” were laid
on to attract the attention of the radar stations that remained active. In
addition, a major electronic jamming barrage was employed for over five
and one-half hours to cover the flight of the airborne forces and the night
air attacks.II7 Exact assessment of the effects of these measures is not possible.
But it is clear that the landing forces achieved tactical surprise; the
airborne flights were not attacked by fighters (although they did take casualties
from flak); and, in general, the aircraft warning and reporting services
of the Luftwaffe worked very badly, if at all. AEAF calculated that,
on the night of June 5/6, no more than eighteen percent of German radar
coverage in northwest France was functioning.Il*
The Luftwaffe forces deployed to meet this onslaught were weak and
badly dispersed. Luftflotte 3, the Luftwaffe command in the west, possessed
about 325 bombers of one description or another. Approximately
180 of these were the antishipping forces of Fliegerkorps X and Fliegerdivision
2 based in southern and southwestern France. The remainder were
in northwestern France, Belgium, and Holland. On paper these forces were
capable of doing some damage, but they contained a very high percentage
of untrained crews whose ability to find targets and hit them was suspect.
Worse still, they could not expect to attack in daylight without a powerful
escort of fighters. Luffflotte 3 possessed only about 170 single-engine fighters.
The ground-attack forces were pitiful, numbering only about 75 aircraft.
Lufrflotte 3 had requested more of these, but the Luftwaffe High
Command decided that the Russian threat to the Romanian oilfields was
more serious and kept over 500 aircraft of the fighter-bomber force
deployed in the east.Il9
The High Command had planned to meet the invasion threat by transferring
the bulk of the fighters in Luftflotte Reich to LuftJotte 3. Fields and
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