Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
Ariake Bay, and Kushikino, to overcome the ground defenses, and to cover
the preliminary amphibious operations.Iz3
Why the Japanese, after losing Okinawa, had been keeping their air
forces on a tight leash, withholding commitment or strictly avoiding losses,
could easily be surmised by the Americans: the enemy seemed unwilling to
accept a reduction in reserves below the level deemed necessary for the
final defense of the country. It was believed by MacArthur’s headquarters
that, through rigid economy, the Japanese would strive to replace their
severe losses to date and to rebuild their inventory, not only by careful
control of attempted interception of U.S. air strikes but also by concentrating
in Japan all planes that could be spared from other areas. Indeed, there
was evidence that the Japanese were already heavily tapping into their field
forces in Manchuria to reinforce the homeland, despite the risk of weakening
the Manchurian front in the face of Russia’s potential entry into the war
against Japan. By the time Operation OLYMPIC was to be launched, the
Japanese could be expected to have had time to increase the number of
planes immediately available in the homeland area to 2,000-2,500, of which
1,500-2,000 would be first-line aircraft and the rest training planes and
obsolete or obsolescent models. The number, distribution, and types of
Japanese airfields and landing grounds, estimated at 200 and supplemented
by facilities in Korea and China, were deemed to be entirely adequate for
the number of aircraft at hand or likely to come on line in the foreseeable
future. According to U.S. intelligence, there was a possibility that the Japanese
would withdraw their land-based aviation to the Asian mainland for
protection from the neutralizing attacks. The relocated force would then
operate against the enemy armies invading Kyushu by staging through
fields in Japan.IZ4
Initial air opposition to OLYMPIC was expected to be “as intense and
violent as [the Japanese] can make it,” according to U.S. intelligence, even
before the actual landings. The counterattacks would emanate from northern
Kyushu, southwest Honshu, Shikoku, and South Korea. American
strategists, however, believed that the enemy would be quickly compelled
to curtail the air defense of Kyushu, lest the all-important Tokyo area be
left entirely or inadequately protected. Hence, quite early in the fighting,
just as soon as it became apparent to the defenders that success on Kyushu
was unlikely, the Japanese would abandon mass air attacks, after having
expended no more than 500 to 800 planes in efforts to prevent U.S. landing
and consolidation operations. Thereafter the Japanese would go over to
the strictly defensive mode, and the scale of air effort would be reduced
to intermittent sorties, involving a small number of aircraft, emphasizing
suicide crashes of “uncertain proportions,” mainly during hours of
darkness.
Though the Japanese Navy would employ its last large and midget submarines
and small assault demolition or suicide craft to contest the landings
434