Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE
“fluid pair.” This was the tactical concept embraced by Tolkovsky, a concept
that effectively doubled his offensive fffe power without any increase
in the number of aircraft.
Two such pairs formed a “fluid four” or, in IAF’s terms, a “two element
combat formation,” the Israelis evolving “their own special brand [of
doctrine] mainly after 1953 when the first Meteor jets were acquired.”
According to former Commander of the IAF Maj. Gen. Benjamin Peled:
Each fighter pilot must.. . bring to bear the maximum killing potential of his own
expertise and his aircraft’s weapons.. .to be orchestrated by the element leaders..
.within the environment of eyeball, radar, commint [communications intelligence]
and elint [electronic intelligence] information within his group and from
outside forces available to him. Each leader will decide on the spot the type of
deployment he judges to be most conducive to achieve the maximum kills per engagement.
This will also be the aim of each individual pilot.. .within the following
constraint; [that] the order to initially engage and finally disengage is the leader’s
prerogative [and] a disabled member [of the group] will be escorted at all times.”17
Operation KADESH
Tolkovsky’s ideas were only budding into reality when they were
required to meet their first test. During the latter part of 1955 the Soviet
Union had begun delivering substantial quantities of modern weapons
systems (including MiG-15 fighters) to Egypt, the most powerful of
Israel’s potential enemies. Then, in the spring of 1956 came the announcement
that Egypt, Syria, and Jordan would each place their national
forces under a single, unified command in the event of hostilities with
Israel. There was every likelihood that Iraq would join them. The Suez
Canal and the Strait of Tiran (leading into the Gulf of Aquaba) were both
closed to Israeli shipping, and Egyptian forces began to concentrate in
the Sinai.
The danger of coordinated attacks on several fronts was only too
obvious, and the Israeli assessment was that actual hostilities only waited
on Arab convenience. The Israeli decided to strike first and, conspiring
with the British and French, who hoped to recover control of the canal,
they launched Operation KADESH. They planned to smash the Egyptian
forces in the Sinai, take the Gaza Strip-thus shortening their border somewhat-and,
by seizing Sharm-el-Sheikh, at the southern tip of the Sinai,
break the Arab blockade of the Gulf of Aquaba.Is However, they would
stop short of the Suez Canal, relying on the intervention there of British
and French forces (in operations designed to reacquire the canal on the
pretext that freedom of navigation was threatened by the Egyptian-Israeli
conflict) to discourage the Arab alliance from escalating the campaign into
a full-scale war.
Since their objectives were limited, the Israelis planned to restrict their
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