Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
production. USSTAF appears to have made a good decision on the basis of
bad evidence.
The picture in other areas was more positive. ULTRA, for example,
provided much information that indicated the strains and stresses that were
being imposed on individual Luftwaffe formations during the course of the
bombing offensive. ULTRA revealed the shortages in combat pilots that
were brought on by intensive air operations as early as the last few months
of 1943.138 Information of this kind encouraged USSTAF to persist in the
emphasis on attrition. Also, this information probably contributed to the
growing confidence with which AEAF approached the impending air battle
over the invasion beaches. The Luftwaffe might intervene, but it could not
be expected to be effective or to persist in a large-scale effort.
ULTRA information was also helpful in operational planning. Intercepts
of German weather reports, particularly the excellent ones put out by the
SS at Cracow, were valuable aids. Knowledge of order of battle and disposition
of the fighter and flak defenses contributed greatly to mission planning.
Analysis of German fighter radio traffic took on much greater
importance as time went on, providing knowledge of take-off times, assembly
routes, and rendezvous points. In the first part of the daylight strategic
bombing campaign, this information was used for planning evasive tactics
and the relays of the escorts. Its value increased, of course, when tactics
became more aggressive and a portion of the escort ranged ahead of the
bomber formation to attack the defenders while they were assembling.
When the assault against the Luftwaffe forced the defenders to operate
from bases deeper in Germany, the quality of radio interception decreased,
and the Eighth Air Force began to use a new intelligence tool that the Fifteenth
had pioneered beginning in February: airborne radio-intercept
stations.139
In addition, ULTRA provided confirmation of the wisdom of the
experimental attacks on oil. The day after the first of these attacks (on
May 12), an ULTRA intercept indicated that a transfer of flak from the
Eastern Front to France (Luftjotte 3) was diverted to provide additional
flak support to the hydrogenation plants. In addition, flak batteries operating
in protection of certain aircraft factories were to be similarly
redeployed. I4O
Signals intelligence proved to be even more valuable in the fight for
local air superiority. “Y” Service and ULTRA often provided warning of
enemy raids in advance of radar plots. More importantly, ULTRA helped to
blunt the Luftwaffe strategy of mass reinforcement. It gave notice of movement
orders, including times of departure and arrival, as well as identifying
the airfields to which transfers were being made. After Allied attacks on
those fields were made, ULTRA picked up German damage reports that
were particularly valuable, either as a complement to or substitute for aer-
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