29.12.2013 Views

Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

AIR SUPERIORITY<br />

<strong>the</strong> bullets fired and <strong>the</strong> chance that bullets would f<strong>in</strong>d a target. The USAF<br />

had accepted <strong>the</strong> same armament <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> F-86, and <strong>the</strong> wisdom <strong>of</strong> that decision<br />

seemed proven by <strong>in</strong>itial MiG-Sabre engagements. However, <strong>the</strong> decision<br />

to equip <strong>the</strong> F-86 with 50-caliber mach<strong>in</strong>eguns put a premium on<br />

skilled pilots, which was no problem until <strong>the</strong> USAF began to run through<br />

<strong>the</strong> supply <strong>of</strong> World War I1 combat veterans.<br />

The Sabre was a responsive aircraft and could outmaneuver <strong>the</strong> MiG<br />

at altitudes below 25,000 feet. Even <strong>the</strong> F-86A, which did not have powerassisted<br />

controls, was a relatively easy aircraft to fly. Though faster than its<br />

World War I1 predecessors, <strong>the</strong> F-86 was actually more nimble <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> hands<br />

<strong>of</strong> a skilled flier. The controls transmitted less vibration to <strong>the</strong> pilot, so that<br />

<strong>the</strong> physical stra<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> fly<strong>in</strong>g was significantly reduced.35 Compared with<br />

piston-eng<strong>in</strong>e fighters, <strong>the</strong> F-86 could rapidly reach a fight<strong>in</strong>g altitude, and<br />

its ability to use its weight as a source <strong>of</strong> momentum <strong>in</strong> dives partially<br />

compensated for its <strong>in</strong>ability to outclimb MiGs. None<strong>the</strong>less, its range was<br />

limited. There was no provision for <strong>in</strong>flight refuel<strong>in</strong>g, so Sabres could only<br />

extend <strong>the</strong>ir range by carry<strong>in</strong>g drop tanks mounted below <strong>the</strong> w<strong>in</strong>gs. In a<br />

dogfight, however, <strong>the</strong> drop tanks were a def<strong>in</strong>ite hazard, so pilots would<br />

jettison <strong>the</strong>m if action appeared imm<strong>in</strong>ent. The 4th Fighter-Interceptor<br />

Group (4th FI Group) found <strong>in</strong> its early encounters with MiGs that many <strong>of</strong><br />

its drop tanks would not release, “and <strong>the</strong> failure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tanks to release<br />

with complete effectiveness adversely affected pilot p~ychology.”~~ It took<br />

about three months for 4th Fighter-Interceptor W<strong>in</strong>g ma<strong>in</strong>tenance personnel<br />

to learn that <strong>the</strong> problem was caused by moisture freez<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> tank’s<br />

shackle assemblies at high altitudes. The tank releases were simply freez<strong>in</strong>g<br />

shut under certa<strong>in</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ations <strong>of</strong> moisture and temperature. The 4th<br />

W<strong>in</strong>g personnel tried attach<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> heaters used <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 50-caliber mach<strong>in</strong>eguns<br />

to <strong>the</strong> planes’ tank mount<strong>in</strong>gs, but <strong>the</strong> gun heaters “were short <strong>in</strong><br />

USAF supply and critically short <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Far East.”37 <strong>Air</strong> Materiel Command<br />

specialists f<strong>in</strong>ally hit on <strong>the</strong> solution: pack<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> mount<strong>in</strong>g shackles with a<br />

waterpro<strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>sulat<strong>in</strong>g compound. The problem <strong>of</strong> w<strong>in</strong>g tanks that would not<br />

drop was largely elim<strong>in</strong>ated by July 1951, but it would have been a very<br />

serious problem <strong>in</strong>deed if Ch<strong>in</strong>ese air forces had been able to mount major<br />

MiG attacks <strong>in</strong> April and May.<br />

<strong>Air</strong>-to-air fighter tactics were similar to those used <strong>in</strong> World War TI.<br />

The major differences were closure speed (<strong>of</strong>ten over 1,000 miles per hour<br />

as oppos<strong>in</strong>g aircraft flew at each o<strong>the</strong>r at near mach airspeeds) and <strong>the</strong> high<br />

speed at which engagements began. The <strong>in</strong>itial high speeds were <strong>of</strong>ten<br />

translated <strong>in</strong>to rapid, high-G-force maneuvers, as MiGs and Sabres rolled,<br />

turned, and twisted to get <strong>in</strong>to a shoot<strong>in</strong>g position. Yet <strong>the</strong> basic maneuvers<br />

were what <strong>the</strong>y had been <strong>in</strong> World War I1 because <strong>the</strong> goal was still <strong>the</strong><br />

same: to hold a command<strong>in</strong>g position on an opponent long enough to shoot<br />

him down. That usually meant gett<strong>in</strong>g on his tail and clos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> range to a<br />

thousand feet or less. And, as <strong>in</strong> World War 11, <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> each <strong>in</strong>dividual<br />

470

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!