Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
strength” did not necessarily mean that the aircraft was a total loss. In
peacetime, it had indeed meant that the squadron could happily get a new
machine, and the old one would probably be put on the scrap heap. In
wartime, especially after the arrival of the Beaverbrook organization, a
machine was more apt to be sent for repairs, although listed as “struckoff”-no
longer having to be accounted for by the squadron. By September
the struck-off rate was running at around ten percent of the aircraft available
in Fighter Command.
During this period, the production of new Hurricanes and Spitfires
remained fairly constant: 394 in July, 463 in August, and 373 in September.
But the number of repaired Hurricanes and Spitfires being returned to service
climbed from 85 in June to 121 in July, 146 in August, and 166 in September.
In October, as the pressure of intense fighting dropped off and the civilian
repair organization of the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) under
Beaverbrook’s direction really got underway, supplementing the RAF repair
system, the number of repaired and returned machines rose to 255. (In October
1942, the number of Hurricanes and Spitfires returned to service was 815.)
If the repair organization had been set up earlier, Dowding would have been
under less tension. Until the Ministry of Aircraft Production repair records
are located, it will not be possible to find out the fate of all of the aircraft
officially struck off. Yet, evidently, many of them were rebuilt at MAP units.
In the meantime, where did they go?
Some went to OTUs. But as a production expert confirmed when looking
at the graphs, there has to be another explanation.ss What seems likely
is that, as in the case of the pilots, the figures were being kept in separate
pigeonholes. The RAF was reporting on the aircraft on its official lists.
During the summer, however, “struck off” machines were handed over to
the MAP to be repaired. They did not offically come back until returned to
No. 41 Group, and so it was only in October that the number of aircraft in
storage began to rise satisfactorily. Once again, Dowding and Fighter Command
were at a disadvantage, fighting a crucial battle with a less than fully
mobilized machine.
As cumulative maintenance needs began to overwhelm the squadrons,
fatigue affected the ground crews as well as the pilots. Accidents increased
as pressures rose and living conditions proved inadequate.
It may well be that part of the problem of manpower management in
1940 was related to the common administrative failure to appreciate the
rapid upward curve of compound growth. (See Table 3-1) Other factors
were a shortage of staff officers of all sorts, and the fact that statistics was
still a relatively new field. By peacetime standards Fighter Command had
been expanded, but the Air Staff did not realize early enough that there
were trained pilots and ground crew available, waiting to be allotted to
fighting units as needed. Because of this, perhaps one-third of the RAF was
unemployed at the end of September 1940.
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