Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

CONCLUSION
with the enemy. Given the flexibility and ease with which aircraft can be
moved over long distances to counter a surprise thrust by the enemy, it has
repeatedly come about, that tactical units are deployed immediately to the
threatened location while the infrastructure of support follows at a far more
laggard pace.
The experience of the USAF in Korea afforded a painful example. At
first the advantage lay with the North Koreans; the USAF infrastructure
initially was largely lacking. The hard-won experience of World War I1 as
to the critical importance of well-equipped engineer units ready to roll on
call seemed to have been lost. The skills and equipment required by basebuilding
engineer units manned by experienced reservists were not immediately
available when the need arose in Korea.
Somewhat more comprehensible were the early shortages in such
specialized categories as photo interpreters, aviation ordnance men and the
like, despite the pool of talent developed in such fields as these during
World War 11. These kinds of shortages certainly highlight the importance
of command support for a well trained reserve force in precisely those categories
where lack of peacetime funding makes it impossible to sustain
adequate strength in the active force.
In the battle for air superiority there are many dimensions to the matter
of ancillary activities. Air-sea rescue presents a case in point. The long
delay experienced by the British in developing a suitable rescue service at
the onset of World War I1 cost the RAF many experienced pilots who had
successfully parachuted into the sea from crippled aircraft. Despite this
clear precedent, the USAF only belatedly perfected its air-sea rescue capabilities
in Vietnam. To be sure, that organization, when mature, performed
superbly, but in some future conflict the needless loss at sea of some of the
most highly trained active force pilots in the initial stages of a conflict might
well spell the difference between success and failure.
Yet another critical element in the logistical infrastructure is the capacity
to effect prompt maintenance and repair, which sustains the high sortie
rate so essential to air superiority. Here command decisions can have a
direct impact. The relative merits of performing maintenance at the squadron
level or in a consolidated facility at some higher echelon has long been
debated. During peacetime, efficiency and economy seem to favor consolidation.
But in wartime, the case for consolidation is by no means so positive.
Where rapid repair of battle damage is a consideration, squadron level
maintenance has much to be said for it. Whichever alternative is adopted,
in wartime a fast and efficient maintenance and repair organization is a
force multiplier.
The issue of battle damage repair for aircraft leads to air base survivability
as a factor in air superiority. Here the experience of the RAF during
the Battle of Britain is instructive. In peacetime, convenience and economy
dictated a concentration of facilities adjacent to the runways. In wartime,
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