Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

NORTHWEST AFRICA
The failure of the Allies to capture Tunisia in November, before the
Axis forces arrived in strength, forced the Allies to fight a winter campaign
in the mountainous region of western Tunisia. The Luftwaffe quickly developed
a number of all-weather airfields and ground support facilities on the
coastal plain of eastern Tunisia. The enemy was thus “in the remarkable
position of fighting on an equality, if not actually possessing tactical air
superiority, since Allied ground organization was faced by immeasurably
greater problems, which were only gradually overcome,” stated one Royal
Air Force (RAF) observer.* The lack of Allied all-weather airfields within
operational range of eastern Tunisia permitted the enemy to have de facto
aerial superiority over all of T~nisia.~ The first Allied air objective, therefore,
was to gain air superiority over Tunisia and the central Mediterranean
by destroying Axis aircraft either on the ground or in the air. Accomplishing
this proved difficult.
Allied Air Force Problems with Doctrine
The AAF’s Twelfth Air Force and the RAF’s Eastern Air Command
were not prepared in terms of doctrine or command and control to fight a
prolonged campaign in Tunisia. Committed primarily to a strategy of strategic
bombardment, the AAF and RAF had given too little thought before
the war to requirements for a campaign such as the one in Tunisia. In such
a campaign, aircraft would have to be used not only for strategic bombardment,
but also for maritime missions, interdiction, close air support
of ground forces, and, most importantly, for gaining and maintaining air
superiority throughout an area that embraced not just Tunisia proper, but
also the whole central Mediterranean region. The RAF had gained invaluable
experience in this vein since the inception of aerial operations in the
Middle East in 1940. However, competition for men and resources with
other sectors of a worldwide conflict hampered internal codification of
various lessons learned. The AAF had virtually no similar experience to
draw upon.
The AAF, being part of the U.S. Army at the time, had doctrine imposed
on it by senior officers who knew little about the actual employment
of air power in modern warfare. Field manuals, setting forth air doctrine,
largely reflected the thinking of Army ground officers. As a result, such
missions as close air support, air superiority, and maritime operations were
addressed imprecisely. For example, FM 1-5, Employment of Aviation of
the Army, issued on April 15, 1940, failed to clarify such topics. Nor did
such manuals as FM 1-10, Tactics and Techniques of Air Attack (1942)
address in realistic terms such subjects as escort of bombers, close air support
of ground troops, or maritime operations. FM 31-35, Aviation in
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