Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
More specifically, they were to attack a group of key target systems, among
which the German aircraft industry was ranked second. In June, the Allied
Combined Chiefs of Staff issued a new policy to govern the strategic
bomber offensive-the POINTBLANK Directive. In that document, the
German aircraft industry, particularly that part of it devoted to fighter
production, was elevated to the status of an “intermediate” objective
second to none. The idea behind this particular language was that air
superiority was not an end in itself, but the means to strategic attack on
other key target systems. The air superiority and the attack on other
systems were part of the preparation for OVERLORD, but many American
and British airmen privately believed that the strategic bombing
campaign would be decisive, reducing the invasion to a mere exercise in
occupation.35
Three commands made up the Allied long-range heavy bomber
forces-RAF Bomber Command, and the American Eighth and Fifteenth
Air Forces. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, the Commander in Chief
of RAF Bomber Command, was completely unconvinced of the merits of
any attempt to attack limited and specific target systems, an approach he
derided as “panacea” bombing. He thought such an approach was tactically
unfeasible and he believed fervently in Bomber Command’s powers
to bring Germany to defeat by destroying her major cities.36 Sir Arthur
Harris’s views ensured that the POINTBLANK Directive was written to permit
him enough latitude to carry on with his campaign. Elements of the
RAF Air Staff, chiefly the Director of Bomber Operations (Air Commodore
S. 0. Bufton) and the Deputy Chief of Air Staff (Air Marshal Sir Norman
Bottomley), believed that the attack on the aircraft industry was so important
that Bomber Command ought to join in, despite the obvious tactical
difficulties. As 1943 wore on and the American Eighth Air Force ran into
grave difficulties in its attempts to carry out the POINTBLANK Directive,
Bufton and Bottomley pressed Sir Arthur Harris to change his views3’ Not
until February 1944, almost eight months after POINTBLANK had begun, did
Bomber Command attack Schweinfurt, one of the most important targets
in the POINTBLANK program. The British Official History regards this attack
as the first blow of a genuine “Combined Bomber Offen~ive.”~~ As a
result, in the first stages of the campaign for a general air superiority, the
main burden fell on the Eighth Air Force and its commander, Maj. Gen.
Ira C. Eaker. The Fifteenth Air Force was not formed until late 1943,
and it made few significant attacks on the German aircraft industry until
the next year.
General Eaker’s efforts to implement the POINTBLANK Directive
were frustrated by several key problems. The first was a considerable improvement
in the German flak and fighter defenses. The POINTBLANK
plan, to which Eaker was a major contributor, had recognized that growth
in the enemy’s fighter force might imperil the attack on vital areas of
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