Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
The Soviet fighter pilots by 1943 no longer flew horizontally all the
time. The new tendency was for the formations to be echeloned upwards.
Aleksandr A. Pokryshkin, who became Russia’s second leading flier in the
number of kills, came up with the dictum in 1943 that altitude was the primary
objective in air combat because it enabled the pilot to dive at his
opponent with the consequent increase in speed and mane~verability.~’ The
Pokryshkin formula was “altitude-speed-maneuver-fire.’’s8 The formula,
however, was easier to chant than to comply with effectively. But as more
and better fighters became available, and machines more comparable to the
German Bf-109s and Focke-Wulf 190s, more Russian pilots followed Pokryshkin’s
guidelines in air combat. The use of vertical tactics became more
widespread as the pilots mastered their new planes, especially the La-5s
and Yak-7Bs.
The euphoria engendered by the victory at Stalingrad and the excellent
showing over the Kuban resulted in an increased aggressiveness on the part
of the Soviet pilots. They began to attack their opponents with more confidence.
It was also early in the spring of 1943 that the so-called “free hunters,”
or Okhotniki, began to operate effectively. The Okhotniki were
volunteers accepted from among the best and most battle-hardened fliers in
the air divisions and regiments. A “free hunting” unit was usually a para
or zveno of fighters or fighter-bombers whose mission was to seek out
targets of opportunity and carry out reconnaissance simultaneously. The
Okhotniki were very effective in tightening the air blockade around the
Stalingrad pocket.
Lack of radar made air defense a difficult chore, and it was not until
the late autumn of 1942 that there was any wide use of radio for fighter
control. The Soviets claimed that at that time the 16th Air Army was
equipped with a radio network for fighter control. It consisted of a central
station at 16th Air Army headquarters, radio stations at divisional and regimental
levels, plus stations along the front for target control. Twenty-five
commanders of reserve regiments were brought in as forward controllers,
and even a manual on directing fighters by radio appeared in September
1942.59
lkaining of Flying Personnel
One of the main causes for the Soviet victory on the Eastern Front was
the Luftwaffe’s ever-increasing shortages in both aircraft and aircrews as
the war wore on. At the outset of the war there was no doubt about the
superiority of the German pilots and their equipment. The Soviet fliers,
lacking the extensive combat experience of the Luftwaffe pilots and flying
inferior aircraft, took a bad beating in the opening months of the war, an
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