Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

LUFTWAFFE AGAINST POLAND
Battle of Britain aimed not only at Fighter Command’s destruction, but also
at the elimination of the bombing threat to Germany.
On the day that Jodl’s memorandum surfaced, Goering issued general
instructions to his forces.loo After redeployment to airfields near Britain,
the Luftwaffe would go after the RAE Its targets would be Fighter Command
and Bomber Command, ground support echelons, and the aircraft
industry. Goering suggested “as long as the enemy air force is not destroyed,
it is the basic principle of the conduct of an air war to attack the enemy
air units at every possible opportunity-by day and night, in the air, and on
the ground-without regard for other missions.” Once the Luftwaffe had
succeeded in gaining air superiority, it would assault British imports and
stockpiles. The heavy losses of the French campaign had indeed made an
impact on the Reichsmarschafl. He urged his commanders to conserve the
Luftwaffe’s fighting strength as much as possible and not allow overcommitments
of either personnel or materiel.
To destroy the RAF and gain air superiority, the Luftwaffe deployed
Second and Third Air Forces in France and the Low Countries and Fifth
Air Force in Norway. The former two components controlled over 2,600
aircraft, while the latter possessed nearly 300 more. (See Table 2-2) The
redeployment of such large air units from bases in Germany required
considerable time and effort. In addition, the Luftwaffe faced difficulties in
making good the losses suffered in France. Thus the two-month hiatus
between victory over France and the beginning of the air campaign
against the British Isles reflected the above factors, as well as German
overconfidence.
German prospects were not helped by their intelligence services. Col.
Joseph “Beppo” Schmid provided the basic survey of the RAF on July
16.101 Like succeeding intelligence work, Schmid’s study was arrogantly
overconfident of Luftwaffe capabilities and generally ignorant about the
British defense system. Schmid only came close to the mark in the quantitative
counters: his estimate calculated that with 50 squadrons the RAF
possessed approximately 900 fighters (675 in commission). (In fact, the
RAF possessed 871 fighters of which 644 were operationally ready.Io2)
Schmid also got the ratio between Spitfire and Hurricanes generally correct
(suggesting a 40-60 ratio). (In the operational squadrons the RAF possessed
279 Spitfires, and 462 Hurricanes, a 38-62 ratio.Io3)
From there, Schmid’s estimate went downhill. Schmid characterized
both the Hurricane and Spitfire as inferior to the Bf-109, while only a
“skillfully handled” Spitfire was superior to the Bf-1 10. He calculated that
British fighter production lay somewhere between 180 and 300 machines
per month (actual production for the month of July reached 496, 476 for
August, and 467 for September)Io4, but argued that production would soon
go down due to reorganization, vulnerability to air attack, and raw material
greatest errors in evaluating the higher levels of British command and con-
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