Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
continued. U.S. aircraft devastated North Vietnam’s petroleum refining
and storage facilities in June and July; in September, ROLLING THUNDER
air strikes were directed against transportation routes. In Washington, the
Central Intelligence Agency argued that the interdiction campaign was not
achieving its objectives, the Joint Chiefs pressed for a more intensive
bombing effort, and the President tempori~ed.~~ In Southeast Asia, Seventh
Air Force F-105s began receiving externally carried jamming pods at the
end of October. The pods held barrage jammers. “If flight members maintained
proper distances, the ECM pods denied the ground radars range,
bearing, and altitude informati~n.”~~ The effect of the pods, combined with
the proper formation of F-1O5s, was cumulative; when coupled with the
spot jamming done by the EB-66s, the impact on North Vietnamese radars
was dramatks7 The NVAF responded by aggressively attacking F-105s,
particularly with MiG-2ls, and that posed a problem for the F-4Cs
escorting the F-105s. The MiG-21 had a higher service ceiling than the
F4C (42,000 feet versus 36,000 feet). Directed by GCI radars, MiG-21s
attacked U.S. strike formations from above, making one diving pass, sometimes
firing a heat-seeking missile, and then zooming away. In their
dives, the MiG-21s did not give escorting F-4Cs time for a missile shot,
and the Phantoms, because of the danger that MiG-17s might pounce on
F-105s from below, dared not fly as a high-altitude screen between the
F-105s and the MiG-21s. Yet the F-4 was faster than the MiG-21 and
possessed a higher rate of acceleration. The trick was to free the F-4 from
its escort role.
On January 2, 1967, 14 flights of FACs, 6 flights of F-105 Iron Hand
SAM suppressors, and 4 flights of F-104 covering fighters departed from
Ubon (8th Tactical Fighter Wing) and Da Nang (366th Tactical Fighter
Wing) and converged on Hanoi as part of Operation BOLO, a scheme to lure
MiG-21s out of their sanctuaries and into the clutches of Seventh Air Force
Phantoms. The F-4Cs (half from Ubon, half from Da Nang) mounted the
jamming pods, which had been carried previously only by the F-105s. The
plan was to have them imitate F-105s and so draw NVAF MiGs out for a
dogfight. Though the force from Da Nang was forced to turn back because
of poor weather, the “bait” from Ubon was challenged by MiGs from Phuc
Yen, fifteen miles northwest of Hanoi. Three flights from the 8th Tactical
Fighter Wing downed seven MiG-21s “within 12 minutes of combat.’’58
Four days later, a second, smaller group of F-~CS, disguised as a reconnaissance
flight, attracted more MiG-21s and shot down two. Apparently reacting,
to such one-sided encounters, the North Vietnamese Air Force avoided
USAF formations until February 1967.59 BOLO showed that MiG-21s could
be defeated by F-4Cs; unfortunately, in February and March Seventh Air
Force units were ordered to attack new ground targets (steel manufacturing
facilities) and there was no time to stage any repeats of the operation of
January 2.
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