Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

OPERATION OVERLORD
Notes
1. JCS 442, Aug 5,1943, “Operation OVERLORD;” RAF Air Historical Branch (hereafter
cited as AHB), “The Liberation of Northwest Europe,” vol I, pp 69-70.
2. The question of the muddled Allied air command has not yet received adequate treatment.
For coverage of this subject in the official histories, see W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate,
The Army Air Forces in World War II, vols I1 and I11 (Chicago, 1949; reprint, Office of Air
Force History, 1983), and Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Straiegic Air
Offensive Againsi Germany, vols I1 and I11 (London, 1961).
3. For a very good recent analysis of the German failure to develop a larger air force,
see R. J. Overy, Goering, The “Iron Man” (London, 1984), chap 7.
4. On the confusion in German strategy, see Ibid.; and Williamson Murray, Siraiegy for
Defeat: The Lufiwaffe, 1933-1945 (Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1983) pp 222-24, 245-55. On Luftwaffe
strategy to meet the invasion in the west, see AHB, The Rise and Fall ofthe German
AirForce, 1933-1945 (London, 1948), pp 316-25; and Murray, pp 277-85.
5. AHB, “Luftwaffe Strength and Serviceability Tables, 1938-45,” USAF Historical Research
Center (AFHRC) K5002, fr 0432-5; AHB, “The Liberation of Northwest Europe,”
Ill, appendix 1, AFHRC 23357, fr 1050.
6. The best introduction to a comparative analysis of aircraft production is R. J. Overy,
The Air War, 1939-1945 (New York, 1982), PB edition, pp 149-84.
7. For a excellent discussion of this background, see Klaus Maier, “Der Aufbau der
Luftwaffe und Ihre Strategisch-Operation Konzeption Insbesondere Gegenueber den Westmaechten,”
in Deuischland und Frankreich, 1936-1939 (Munich, 1981), and the section on
the Luftwaffe in Wilhelm Deist, The Wehrmachi and German Rearmameni (London, 1981).
A very good recent account can be found in Murray, Straiegy for Defeai, pp 1-21. An important
feature to note about this last work is its extensive use of German sources.
8. AHB, The Rise and Fall of rhe German Air Force, 1933-1945, pp 21-33.
9. United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), “Aircraft Division Industry Report”
(ADIR), pp 21-3.
10. This was in part the product of a considerable underestimate of the production of
potential adversaries. Overy, The Air War, pp 22-23. See also Overy, Goering, chap 7.
11. Overy, The Air War, table 12, p 150.
12. Ibid. On American aircraft production, see Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces
in World War II. vol VI, pp 263-361; also I. B. Holley, Buying Aircrafi: Materiel Procurementfor
the Army Air Forces (Washington, 1964).
13. For a comparative overview of Allied and German training, see Overy, The Air War,
pp 138-45.
14. Richard Suchenwirth, Historical Turning Poinis in ihe German Air Force War Effort
[USAF Historical Study #I891 (New York, 1968), pp 20-21.
IS. Ibid., pp 21-28; AHB, Rise and Fall, pp 203-05, 314-16; USSBS, Military Analysis
Division (MAD), “The Defeat of the German Air Force,” pp 3-6; USSBS, MAD, Interrogation
of Lt. Gen. Werner Kreipe, Jun 4, 1945, National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA), RG 243, Box 1.
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