Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
had drastically improved. The new F-86Fs, for example, were the first
Sabre models able to fight MiGs above 40,000 feet and F-86F pilots immediately
began piling up kills. In October 1952, the Sabre patrols received
the support of a new air warning and fighter director radar station located
on Cho-do Island off the west coast of North Korea. The new station
gave them much of the GCI capability already possessed by the Chinese
Communist Air Force.
Fighter maintenance was also improved by the creation of a Rear-
Echelon Maintenance Combined Operations (REMCO) maintenance and
supply group for the 4th and 51st Fighter-Interceptor Wings. The REMCO
concept had been applied first to light bomber and fighter-bomber wings. A
REMCO was created by pooling equipment and technicians drawn from
several wings stationed in Korea. The REMCO itself was in Japan, with
Japanese labor and shops at hand and in use. REMCO personnel performed
100-hour checks on 4th and 5lst Fighter-Interceptor Wing aircraft, as well
as any major modifications and heavy repairs.1oo The REMCO organization
was not without faults, but it was a means of overcoming the lack of adequate
maintenance facilities at fields such as Kimpo and Suwon. The fourth
reason for the high scores of the F-86 wings was the unwillingness of
Chinese air forces to attack U.N. airfields in Korea for fear of U.N. retaliation
in kind. FEAF had sent F-94B Starfires (all-weather, two-seat versions
of the F-80) to Korea in December 1951 to combat night attacks, but
concern that the characteristics of their highly classified radar fire control
system might be compromised restricted F-94B deployment to reactive air
defense flights until November 1952. Defense of U.N. airfields in South
Korea was certainly weak in 1951 and not much improved in 1952 because
of a lack of GCI radars and enough ground-based antiaircraft guns. Fortunately
for Fifth Air Force, enemy air units could not or would not exploit
this weakness.
There was one other reason why 4th and 51st Wing F-86s more than
held their own against MiGs in the fall of 1952: superior tactics. USAF
tactical doctrine was sound, and the F-86 wings constantly reviewed it. In
the fall of 1952, the enemy MiGs challenged the Sabres with larger tactical
formations, still hoping to wear down the F-86 wings. The tactic failed. The
USAF pilots soon discovered that, if they could just get enough aircraft
into the battle area, then the old rules about two-aircraft elements still
applied. As one veteran pilot recalled, “In air-to-air combat, it’s over like
that. Snap! . . . Somebody comes in and makes a pass and gets shot down.
It’s a rarity for the big dogfight. Very, very rare.’’lOl Or, as F-86 “ace” Maj.
Frederick “Boots” Blesse put it in his 1953 manual of air-to-air tactics,
“If you can split the tactical formation of the enemy, more often than
not his mutual support efforts against you will be ineffective.”Io2 As in
1950 and especially 1951, the larger MiG forces could not translate
their greater numbers into tactical superiority. As groups of opposing
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