Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
years. But suddenly, conflicts in Spain, the Far East, and ultimately in
Europe itself at the end of the decade thrust aviators into a position of
having to rethink and refashion air superiority issues. It becomes necessary,
therefore, to understand the individual progress made by the major
air powers of the world in the 1930s. Identification of the peculiar
approaches taken by each nation to the air superiority question can be identified
and used to clarify that nation’s approach to air power as it entered
the Second World
Italy
Given the importance of Douhet, it might have been expected that his
native Italy would have stood at the forefront of military aviation during
this period. In fact, political and economic problems plagued that nation
until Benito Mussolini seized power in 1922. The dictator embraced
Douhet’s theories insofar as he could use them for political purposes. He
slowly built a domestic Italian aviation industry and an independent air
force. He encouraged competition for aircraft designs and stimulated public
displays of the new Italian aircraft such as the crossing of the North
Atlantic from Rome to Chicago and back by a squadron of 24 seaplanes in
1933. By the end of the decade, I1 Duce could boast about 29 firms building
aircraft and 6 making engines. In short, Mussolini’s regime converted
the Italian air arm (Regia Aeronautica) from an aging 1,000-airplane
force in 1922 to a powerful combat arm numbering 2,600 aircraft in 1939.
Of course, there were also accompanying problems to the rise of Italian
air strength.32
On the one hand, Mussolini’s air force followed the Douhet theory of
organizational independence. The Regia Aeronautica comprised four
branches: an independent air force, an army cooperation contingent, a
naval air service, and a colonial air force. Air officers studied Douhet’s
theories, but in practice, the Aeronautica was more heavily involved in
army cooperation and tactical employment than strategic bombing. This
became evident in Ethiopia during 1935-36 and during the Spanish Civil
War. Ethiopia was too primitive a land to really test Douhet’s theory of
strategic bombardment, but Italian aviators gained experience in the use of
various types of projectiles and in air-dropping ammunition, food, and
water to Italian soldiers. Spain also provided mainly tactical experience,
even though Italian air units, based on the Balearic Islands, Sardinia, and
mainland Italy, claimed to have accomplished successful independent strategic
bombardment missions against cities and harbors at heights of 16,000
to 18,000 feet. Italian air leaders maintained that they paralyzed Barcelona,
particularly over a 30-day bombardment campaign; however, the weakness
18