Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE
Consequently, the proposed combined air-ground assault took place
the following morning, with the Syrian missile screen still in disarray and
both Israeli aircraft and heavy artillery pounding missile sites in order to
ensure that there would be no quick recovery. Israeli armor pushed
forward, its axis of advance the road to Damascus. The IAF had no
trouble with the Syrian Air Force either: aircraft on the ground were
housed in hardened shelters-the Syrians had not failed to learn the lessons
of 1967-but “most airfields were closed for long durations, due to
accurate hits on their runways.” Very few Syrian planes got into the air,
and of those that did two were shot down in air-to-air engagements.Il9
Interdiction and close air support missions were flown with minimal
losses and considerable effect in a permissive environment, just as in the
halcyon days of 1967.
On the southern front both Israeli and Egyptian air forces flew some
close air support sorties, but neither could operate with the confidence and
precision that accompanies assured air superiority and precedes effective
air support. The airspace of the western Sinai was a no-man’s-land of skirmishes
and small-scale raids until October 14, when the Egyptians loyally
answered a call to alleviate the pressure facing their Syrian allies-now
being driven back on Saasa. They launched a second phase ground offensive
designed to carry them to the high ridges another 9.3 miles east,
though not all Egyptians agreed with the decision to attack. General el
Shazly recalls telling his Minister for War that “the enemy air force is still
too strong to be challenged by our own. And we do not have sufficient
mobile SAMs to provide air cover. . . . The enemy air force can still cripple
our ground forces as soon as they poke their noses beyond our SAM
umbrella.’.’ I*”
El Shazly’s predictions were accurate. The EAF made no great effort
to challenge the IAF, although some of the Libyan Mirages flew their first
sorties and two were shot down.l2I Consequently, Israeli airmen were able
to fulfill their traditional close support role in disrupting the Egyptian
assault.’22 Very untypically, the victors “did not pursue the battered Egyptian
columns as they withdrew; the apparent failure was perhaps due to the
inability of the IAF to carry its tactical air support into the SAM ’box,’ and
the unwillingness of the Israelis to expose themselves to Egyptian A[nti]
T[ank] fire without such support.’’IZ3
The worst problems with the missile screen seem to have been largely
limited to Israeli aircraft engaged in close air support in which Egyptian
targets were small and often mobile, and it was necessary to attack from
low altitudes in order to be effective. From the 8th on, the IAF had been
bombing the floating bridges that the Egyptians had thrown across the
canal with relative impunity. “At about one pm-I don’t remember exactly-the
air force went for those fourteen bridges without a single missile
battery being hurt,” recalls Peled. “All in place, all in working order. But
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