Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
Bibliographical Essay
The struggle to gain air superiority for OVERLORD and the strategic bombing
campaign of which it formed a part have been among the most widely discussed
subjects in the literature of the Second World War. A short essay of this kind cannot
hope to be exhaustive, but a few of the most reliable and interesting items can be
identified.
Even after a considerable passage of time, the official history-The Army Air
Forces in World War II-edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, 7
vols, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948-58; reprint, Office of Air Force
History, 1983) remains a solid piece of scholarship. Its major shortcomings are to be
found in those subjects that it fails to treat or passes over lightly, chiefly intelligence
and the less edifying aspects of the organizational politics of high command. Of
equal importance to the subject are the four volumes of the British official history,
The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 4 vols (London: HMSO, 1961), written
by Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland. This work is especially important
for its repeated emphasis on the fact that air strategy was (and, by implication, still
is) dominated by operational factors. A good single-volume introduction to the strategic
air war is Anthony Verrier, The Bomber Offensive (New York: Macmillan,
1969). Basil Collier’s The Defence of the United Kingdom (London: HMSO, 1957) is
essential to understanding the achievement and maintenance of air superiority over
the Allied base of operations. All four volumes of the newest of the official histories
have been published-British Intelligence in the Second World War by E H. Hinsley,
et al. (London: HMSO, 1978-84). While they do not satisfy our curiosity in every
respect, they are clearly superior to anything else on this subject, official or private.
The failure to produce an American counterpart is to be regretted.
The best single volume is R. J. Overy, The Air War, 1939-1945 (New York: Stein
and Day, 1980). Its coverage is comprehensive, its analysis is comparative, and its
interpretation judicious. Overy’s Goering: The “Zron Man” (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1984) is of a similar quality. Among the general histories of the Luftwaffe,
two are most important. The British Air Ministry study, The Rise and Fall of
the German Air Force, 1939-1945 (London: HMSO, 1948; reprint, New York: St.
Martin’s, 1983) is dated but contains some useful information. Williamson Murray’s
Strategyfor Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933-1945 (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press,
1983) is a recent and important addition to the literature. Murray has made extensive
use of the German archival material originally held by the British Air Ministry and
subsequently returned to Germany. He has emphasized how critical the production
decisions made early in the war were to the defeat of the Luftwaffe. He has also
made the valuable point that the attrition inflicted by the suffering Eighth Air Force
in the last six months of 1943 was a very important contribution to air superiority in
1944.
Good German scholarship has begun to appear in recent years. To date it has
concentrated principally on the rearmament period and the early part of the war.
Especially important are: Klaus Maier, “Der Aufbau der Luftwaffe and Ihre Strategish-Operative
Konzeption Insbesondere Gegenueber den Westmaechten,” in
Deutschland und Frankreich, 1936-39 (Munich: Artemis Verlag, 1981), and the section
on the Luftwaffe in Wilhelm Deist, The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981). The tendency of the Luftwaffe leadership
to concentrate narrowly on operations to the exclusion of the problems of
production, logistics, and training is brought out in Horst Boog, “Higher Command
and Leadership in the German Luftwaffe, 1935-45,” Air Power and Warfare (Washington:
Office of Air Force History, 1979) pp 128-58; and “The Luftwaffe and Tech-
320