Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

WAR AGAINST JAPAN
The Twentieth Air Force itself was assigned the 301st Fighter Wing, and
413th, 414th, 506th, 507th, and 508th Fighter Groups, which were placed
under the operational control of XXI Bomber Command.’)
The increases in AAF aircraft inventory were significant. Whereas in
August 1944 there had been 999 Army planes of all types in the Pacific
Theater, by the middle of July 1945 there were 3,006 Army aircraft. AAF
types and models had also changed significantly. No B-29s were in the
theater in August 1944, but 985 were in place at the end of July 1945. As for
Army fighters, 451 P-47Ns reached the theater between March and July
1945, and the number of P-51s rose from 8 in November 1944 to 348 in July
1945 (in addition to 74 P-61 Black Widows). Once omnipresent, the P-38s
and P-39s were almost thro~gh.’~
To exploit the impending seizure of Iwo Jima, P-51s of the 15th Group
started to land on the island as early as March 6, while the fighting was still
in progress. They were in action in two or three days, relieving the carrier
planes by flying close-support and CAP missions at first. On March 20, a
squadron of night fighters arrived. Three days later, when a second airstrip
was finally ready, the 21st Group flew in. Though resistance had supposedly
ended on the 16th, in late March the camp site of the 21st Group was actually
penetrated by Japanese survivors, who killed forty-four Americans and
wounded twice that number before being driven back. The 306th Fighter
Group arrived on May 11 .”
The Japanese Response: Conventional Approaches
Not until 1943 did Japanese Army Air Force doctrine begin to veer
away from emphasis on traditional ground support tasks to the attainment
of air superiority through the concentration of sizable strength for sustained
air-to-air missions. Old ideas died hard, however, and attention to
protracted air operations was not common. It was widely argued in
IJAAF and IJNAF circles that aviation technology had not progressed
sufficiently, at least so far as Japan was concerned, to develop high-speed,
fast-climbing fighter planes that could operate at great altitudes, at
night, or in adverse weather. Infused with the offensive spirit, IJAAF and
IJNAF officers typically regarded air power as most suitable for attack,
not defensive action. In the Navy, the senior staff still tended to regard
aviation essentially as support for the surface fleet, geared to Jutlandtype
big-gun battle. Japanese military and naval successes in the first
part of the Pacific War naturally fostered euphoria; Army and Navy
planners gave no serious thought through 1943 to the possibility of enemy
landings in Japan. It was only the deterioration of the military situation
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