Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
the ability of the Japanese to operate in the Solomons was significantly
redu~ed.~’
Planes from the South Pacific could not strike Rabaul as easily as the
Allied Air Forces from New Guinea, but they could spread destruction
over Japan’s airfields in the Solomons. By October, Air Command
Solomons Islands (COMAIRSOLS) had something more than 200
fighters, about 175 of them at bases from which they could escort bombers
to Japanese targets. Within reach of Japanese targets were 100
SBDs on Munda, 48 TBFs and 48 B-25s in the Russells, and 52 B-24s
based on Guadalcanal. Navy PBYs and PB4Ys, and RNZAF Venturas
were also available but were used almost entirely for reconnaissance and
rescue work. Attacks were mounted on Japanese airfields every day
that weather permitted, SBDs dive-bombing, fighters glide-bombing,
B-24s striking from up to 20,000 feet, and the B-25s roaring in at treetop
level. It is very significant that by mid-October the ratio of fighter
escort to bombers could be cut in half, and that by the end of October
bomber strikes were hitting these Japanese airfields in daylight without
fighter escort. The fields on and near Bougainville were definitely being
beaten down, with the final blow delivered November 1 by planes from
carriers Saratoga and Princet0n.3~
Despite efforts to mislead them, the Japanese were quite sure that the
Allies would attack Bougainville, and early in the morning on D-day,
November 1, Japanese dive bombers showed up at the Allied invasion site
with a heavy fighter escort. Fine work by a CAP of 8 NZRAF P-40~ and
AAF P-38s so disorganized this attack that the bombers made no hits and
only one near miss. One hundred of the carrier aircraft recently arrived at
Rabaul came in shortly after noon, but they too failed to inflict serious
damage on the landing force; they were preoccupied, in fact, with defending
themselves against 34 mixed fighters that covered the unloading at the
beachhead. That night the Navy won the surface battle of Empress Augusta
Bay, but the Allied task force came under heavy Japanese air attack the
following morning. The fighters and naval antiaircraft fire of COMAIR-
SOLS exacted a heavy price, yet only two American ships were damaged.
There would be little daylight offensive action by Japanese airmen during
the battle for Bougainville. They would be too busy defending their own
bases at Raba~l.~~
Attacks against Rabaul to prevent Japanese interference with Allied
landing on Bougainville were fine examples of cooperation between landbased
and carrier-based air, and between the various services and various
Allies. Bad weather over Rabaul protected it against strikes from New
Guinea on November 1, but the next day seventy-five B-25s escorted by
eighty P-38s reached this primary target. The B-25s struck at shipping in
the harbor, but they were hotly engaged by the Japanese defenders. Allied
losses were so high (twelve B-25s and as many P-38s) that General Kenney
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