Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
winds were from the southwest-during June, July, and August-weather
in the Tonkin Gulf was usually clear. In March and April, and September
and October, the weather was uncertain. After November, the weather in
the Gulf of Tonkin and over most North Vietnamese target areas was rainy
and overcast. The Navy also had to ride out periodic typhoons: “In 1967,
for example, it was Typhoon Billie in July. . . and typhoons Emma and
Gilda in No~ember.”~) The USAF strike forces attacking North Vietnam
from Thailand did not have to worry about typhoons the way the Navy did,
but the heavy clouds over target areas in winter months often made it difficult
to positively identify MiG interceptors that North Vietnamese groundcontrol-intercept
radars vectored toward USAF strike formations.
Together, the rules of engagement-which required visual sightings before
attacking an enemy fighter-and the weather hampered efforts by U.S.
fighters to find and shoot down NVAF M~Gs.~~
From the beginning of ROLLING THUNDER in 1965 through LINE-
BACKER I and LINEBACKER I1 in 1972, there was no single commander of
all U.S. air assets employed against North Vietnam. In 1965, USAF air
units in Southeast Asia were part of the Thirteenth Air Force, whose commander
was headquartered in the Philippines. Thirteenth Air Force was
subordinate to the Commander, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), in Hawaii. In
South Vietnam, air operations were controlled by the 2d Air Division, at
Tan Son Nhut Airfield near Saigon. Second Air Division’s chief was also
the Air Component Commander subordinate to the Commander, U.S. Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV). Navy carrier air
units in the Gulf of Tonkin were organized as Task Force 77, which
received its orders from the 7th Fleet and from the Commander in Chief,
Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) in Hawaii. Overall command in the Pacific
was in the hands of the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), who
reported in turn to the Joint Chiefs (JCS) and Secretary of Defense in
Washington. The lines of command are illustrated in Figure 10-1. As the
size of the USAF contingent in Southeast Asia grew during 1965, 2d Air
Division’s deputy commander was moved to Thailand and given operational
control of Thai-based tactical strike and reconnaissance units. The
purpose was to provide more coordination between aircraft flying into
North Vietnam from South Vietnam and Thailand.2c
As ROLLING THUNDER developed, it became clear that the command
arrangements needed to be altered. The increase in USAF forces in South
Vietnam and Thailand required a larger staff and more senior commanders
and prompted the creation in April 1966 of the Seventh Air Force as a
replacement for the 2d Air Division. The greater number of raids on North
Vietnamese targets by Navy and Air Force planes also required a change.
When Seventh Air Force was organized, its commander was made chairman
of the Air Coordinating Committee. The function of the committee
was to allocate targets and communications frequencies among U.S. strike
518