Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
stocks of fuel and munitions were prepared to receive this force. One German
source indicates, however, that these preparations were miserably
inadequate. The administrative authorities (Luftgau 3) had not constructed
headquarters buildings; dispersal points were not organized; there was a
complete lack of splinter screens, trenches, dug-outs, shelters, and communications
installations.1Zo
Perhaps the most important point to note about the Luftwaffe preparations
to meet the invasion is that the decision to withhold reinforcement of
Lufiflotte 3 from Germany until the invasion had actually begun made it
impossible to intervene with any effect during the first hours of the landings.
The first German sorties flown against the beachheads occurred in the afternoon.
The total amounted to less than 100, mostly by single-engine fighters.
When night fell, the bomber and torpedo-bomber forces flew about 175 sorties
against the landing forces. They were attacked not only by Allied night-fighters
(ADGB and No. 85 Group) but also by their own flak. These could not be
classified as anything more than harassing attacks.IZ1
Reinforcement from Germany began quickly. By June 10 about 300
fighters had been flown to the west. The poor state of base preparation, the
incessant attacks on airfields, and the attacks on aircraft and ground crews
in transit (made possible by ULTRA information) greatly weakened the
effect of these moves. Further confusion was created when the plan to
employ a good portion of this force as fighter-bombers came unstuck. By
June 10 about 25 percent of the fighter force was operating in the ground
attack role, and on the llth, Luftflorte 3 issued orders to fit all fighters
with bomb racks. With the poor state of training for this work, however,
losses were high and the effort entirely ineffective. Accordingly, on the
12th, Luftwaffe High Command ordered that henceforth all fighters
were to concentrate exclusively on enemy aircraft.Iz2 No wonder that the
Chief of Staff of Jugdkorps I1 (the main fighter command) was moved to
complain about the lack of organization and grip in the Luftwaffe higher
command.'*)
The constant Allied pounding of airfields in the days and weeks after
the invasion (interrupted only by bad weather), accompanied by strong
fighter patrols over the battle area, prevented the Luftwaffe from
improving its effort significantly. In day action, Allied fighters intercepted
attacks before they reached the frontline, forcing the Germans to
expend ammunition and fuel (in the case of fighter-bombers, to jettison
their loads), and to return to their fields. The interception of Allied medium
and fighter bomber attacks was not effective because of poor performance
by the German warning and reporting service and pilot inexperience.
This meant that the fighter forces were obliged to attack in small groups
and to confine the bulk of their activity to attempting to protect the army's
lines of communication and to drive back the very dangerous Allied artillery
spotting planes.124
306